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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States generally is immune from suit without its con-
sent. Accordingly, neither Congress nor the executive branch need pay
damages' for any contract breached, any tort committed, or any consti-
tutional right violated by the federal government.2 Although the doc-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I would like to thank Ron Cass, Michael
Klarman, Saul Levmore, Geoff Miller, Paul Mahoney, Bob Scott, Bill Stuntz, and Nick Zeppos for
their thoughtful comments. I would also like to thank Rob Schmidt for his research assistance.
1. Although there has been some debate as to whether sovereign immunity protects the
United States against injunctive and mandamus actions, Congress has waived the government's
immunity from such nondamage actions. See, for example, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988) (stating that "[an
action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim
that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or
under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground
that it is against the United States").
2. The primary exception is the Takings Clause, U.S. Const., Amend. V, which itself requires
that compensation be paid. See text accompanying notes 186-96. Although the Supreme Court
crafted a limited damages remedy for violation of some constitutional rights in Bivens, that rem-
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trine of sovereign immunity persists, it persists subject to near
unanimous condemnation from commentators. Many have rejected the
underlying theory that the "King can do no wrong" as oddly out of
place in our republican government s and many have noted as well that
sovereign immunity was never applied as comprehensively in the past
as it is today.4 Presently, there seems no justification for permitting
government wrongdoing to go unremedied. Indeed, sovereign immunity
confers upon the government an apparent advantage in the market-
place-unlike private individuals and entities, the government is liable
only to the extent it deems appropriate.
Much of sovereign immunity, however, derives not from the infalli-
bility of the state but from a desire to maintain a proper balance among
the branches of the federal government, and from a proper commitment
to majoritarian rule. For instance, Congress understandably might con-
clude that legislators would have too much incentive to conform their
actions to the policy preferences of judges if the judiciary could second-
guess whether congressional action or inaction were negligent. Further-
more, if the judiciary strictly enforced congressional contracts to the
same extent as those of private parties, then succeeding generations
might be bound excessively by the dead hand of Congresses past,
preventing contemporary Congresses from pursuing current concerns as
effectively.
Congress similarly could conclude that some damage actions
against executive branch agencies or officials may distort public policy
objectives. Although Congress is most concerned with safeguarding its
own policy, Congress at times wishes to insulate its delegates in the ex-
ecutive branch who also formulate policy responsive to majoritarian
politics. Judicial review could impede majoritarian policymaking if
judges were empowered to review certain discretionary executive
branch actions for their reasonableness or to force the executive branch
to uphold contractual obligations that it believes are no longer in the
edy can be sought only against federal officials in their individual capacities, subject to qualified or
complete immunity. Even then, the Court recently has curtailed availability of the Bivens remedy.
See note 101.
3. See, for example, Kenneth Culp Davis, 3 Administrative Law Treatise § 25.01 at 435-36
(West, 1958) (stating that "nearly every commentator who considers the subject vigorously asserts
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity must go"). See also Charles 0. Gregory and Harry Kalven,
Jr., Cases and Materials on Torts 730 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1969) (stating that "[n]o very sensible
reasons have ever been advanced for this rule [of sovereign immunity]," and that "there long have
been ill-defined and arbitrary exceptions to the rule of general immunity"); Raoul Berger, Estop-
pel Against the Government, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 680 (1954).
4. Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1, 3 (1924) (stating that
"we consider ourselves bound by the fetters of a medieval doctrine, often regarded as having the
institutional impregnability of an article of faith, which never had much, if any, justification");
Louis L. Jaffee, Judicial Control of Administrative Action at 197-213 (Little, Brown, 1965).
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nation's best interests. Moreover, the prospect of market damages in a
tort or contract suit might deter even the most committed government
officials or legislators from pursuing initiatives that they believe are in
the public interest. Justification for continued sovereign immunity,
therefore, may stem from concerns for preserving majoritarian poli-
cymaking and not from any need to honor hoary traditions.5
Immunity thus plays a vital role in our system; it is not so much a
barrier to individual rights as it is a structural protection for demo-
cratic rule. The dominant justification for sovereign immunity must be
that we trust Congress, unlike any other entity, to set the rules of the
game. That insight derives from the general political accountability of
Congress, both to the public and to the President. Congress may not
always resolve the waiver issue wisely; nevertheless, the Constitution
vests that decision in majoritarian hands, subject to the Takings and
Due Process Clauses.' In determining whether waiver is appropriate,
Congress plausibly may conclude that the potential harm to
majoritarian policymaking from damage actions outweighs the benefits
in added deterrence of tortious conduct by the government, increased
efficiency in contracting, and more equitable compensation of injured
parties.
Those mistrusting Congress may find little comfort in a rule that
authorizes Congress to shield itself from damage actions, and I by no
means argue that the doctrine of sovereign immunity necessarily leads
to better governance, although it may be of some benefit in the contract
context.7 I argue, rather, that despite its bad press, sovereign immunity
comports with our constitutional fabric and is at least normatively
plausible.
5. Maintaining government immunity risks substantial injustice by leaving those injured by
government actions uncompensated when the same injury inflicted by a private party would be
compensable. Although our private law system does not compensate all who are injured by tort or
breach of contract, monetary relief is generally available for most claims.
When the defendant is the United States, however, the results differ markedly. The failure to
pay compensation perhaps can be justified in part if the political process is available to afford the
injured individual or company sufficient relief through other avenues of redress, whether political
or administrative. Federal procurement laws that appear adverse to private military contractors
might be explained on the ground that such contractors have extracted comrnsating benefits
from Congress or the Defense Department, such as a higher contract price.
Yet, persistence of the doctrine of sovereign immunity at times prevents compensation to "de-
serving" plaintiffs. Any continuing role for sovereign immunity thus can only be justified by rely-
ing on an overriding goal of protecting government policy.
6. See Part IV.C.
7. See text accompanying notes 127-33. It may be that our system, at least in the torts con-
text, would benefit if Congress were required affirmatively to legislate immunity, instead of en-
joying immunity as a default rule. Nevertheless, my purpose in this Article is to describe the
immunity rules we have, and not to propose an alternate system.
1992] 1531
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Moreover, retained immunity does not result inevitably in insuffi-
cient deterrence of government misconduct or waste. Congressional pol-
icy, even if not subject to judicial review through a tort or contract
action, is subject to the President's veto power and the electorate's dis-
pleasure. Actions by government officials may be checked by layers of
internal debate, by the need to fashion policy prospectively, by the po-
litical necessity of placating constituents, and by the price that the gov-
ernment must pay to obtain services from the private sector. Congress
also can subject executive branch actions to political checks, whether
exercised by itself or by the courts. The Department of Defense may
change procurement regulations, yet those regulations can be chal-
lenged directly under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")5 or
indirectly through legislative oversight committees. The political and
administrative processes may serve as substitutes for private lawsuits to
deter arbitrary government action.' The doctrine of sovereign immunity
permits Congress to determine when to rely on the political process to
safeguard majoritarian policy.
Concerns for safeguarding majoritarian policy, however, do not jus-
tify Congress's retention of blanket immunity. There are many in-
stances of government negligence and breaches of contract that do not
involve government policymaking.10 For example, government physi-
cians may operate on the wrong patient, or government procurement
officers may breach a contract to take advantage of a cheaper source of
supply. Although all damage actions may affect government policy at
some level, the less that a particular action jeopardizes purposeful pol-
icy, the less the concern from the separation-of-powers vantage point.
At the same time, the further the government action is removed from
purposeful policy, the more remote the possibility that the political pro-
cess can act as an effective check upon government conduct. Govern-
ment actions that are situation-specific, such as physician malpractice,
rarely stem from previously set policy, and thus political forces have
not molded the challenged action. Immunizing such acts from tort suits
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988).
9. Indeed, the separation-of-powers doctrine was designed to that end. See Geoffrey P.
Miller, Rights and'Structure in Constitutional Theory, 8 Social Phil. & Pol. 196, 214-17 (1991);
Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 Va. L. Rev.
1253 (1988).
10. The terms "policy" and "policymaking" defy easy definition. A "policy" suggests a course
of action preceded by deliberation that is intended to set a model or precedent for future conduct
as well. All congressional actions affecting the legal rights of those outside Congress plainly fall
within that definition, as perhaps do certain less formal legislative acts that set a course of con-
gressional conduct. Moreover, I consider all agency rules, regulations, and set practices to be poli-
cies as opposed to actions reflecting only the judgment or reactions of individual government
employees. The line between policy and situation-specific reactions of employees necessarily is
fuzzy and I do not propose any original way to describe the difference. Understanding the distinc-
tion, however, is fundamental in assessing the nature and impact of governmental conduct.
1532 [Vol. 45:1529
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may not force the government to internalize the costs of its actions,
which, in turn, may lead to inefficient governance in the future. Ex-
empting the government from paying damages for breaches of contract
when governmental policy is not threatened might permit opportunistic
behavior and would likely increase the price that the government must
pay for goods and services in the future. Without the deterrent of a tort
or contract action, government officials may pursue shortsighted goals
at the expense of long-range planning and efficiency.
In this Article I argue that separation-of-powers concerns support
vesting the waiver decision in Congress, that Congress's patchwork
waivers largely conform to a pattern that is at least normatively plausi-
ble, and that courts have intervened to review Congress's waiver deci-
sions only in those rare cases in which the political process is least
likely to check governmental wrongdoing.
In Part II, I discuss the structural or separation-of-powers justifica-
tions for sovereign immunity. The doctrine of sovereign immunity al-
lows Congress to determine when the need for preserving majoritarian
policy, set by Congress itself or its delegates in the executive branch,
eclipses the need for private monitoring of governmental conduct. Sov-
ereign immunity plausibly enables Congress to protect majoritarian pol-
icy both from the horizontal pull of comparatively unaccountable
judges, and from the temporal pull of now unaccountable goveinment
officials of the past. Just as Congress likely would not authorize courts
to consider whether it was negligent in failing to address the savings-
and-loan disaster effectively, so sovereign immunity allows Congress to
preclude courts from inquiring through tort actions whether executive
banking agencies negligently implemented congressional policy in regu-
lating the savings-and-loan institutions. Similarly, just as Congress typ-
ically would not permit courts to hold it to prior agreements or
contracts that have become inconsistent with contemporary policy pri-
orities, so sovereign immunity does not force Congress to require execu-
tive branch agencies to pay full damages when changed government
policy makes a prior contract either more expensive for the private con-
tractor to fulfill or contrary to a newly articulated public policy. Con-
gress is the institutional entity best situated to assess waiver on a case-
by-case basis.
In Part III, I analyze government tort law to consider whether Con-
gress's partial rescission of sovereign immunity conforms to the model I
have suggested. I conclude that, to a large extent, Congress has retained
immunity to safeguard national policymaking, which is checked by the
political process. The judiciary, in construing legislative waivers, has
been sensitive to that underlying goal.
Although some aspects of the government's retained tort immunity
19921 1533
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undoubtedly conflict with the rationale for continued immunity that I
sketch, the principal exception to the government's waiver under the
Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")"1-the discretionary function ex-
ception-largely is consistent with the model. This exception precludes
suit in order to prevent the judiciary and claimants from substantially
interfering with the policymaking of Congress and the executive branch
when considerable political checks already exist. Justification is more
problematic for continued immunity from misrepresentation and other
tort claims that do not implicate government policy directly and that,
as a consequence, rarely are checked by the political process.
In Part IV, I turn to government contract law and conclude that
Congress's limited waivers of immunity in this area also are generally
consistent with the suggested model. Congress may have retained im-
munity without intending to confer upon itself or its delegates in the
executive branch an advantage in the marketplace; in fact, retaining
partial immunity actually may raise the government's cost of doing bus-
iness with the private sector. Nevertheless, an immunity rule prevents
one Congress from compromising the ability of future generations to
fashion policy. Judicial decisions reflect the structural objective of
preventing one Congress from binding another in the future. In con-
trast, when comparatively less concern for policymaking is implicated,
Congress generally has waived the government's immunity from con-
tract suit. However, because of the risk that insufficient political checks
constrain Congress in its contracting role, courts independently have
scrutinized Congress's repudiations of prior commitments under the ru-
bric of the Takings and Due Process Clauses. The Fifth Amendment
thus overrides congressional control over immunity decisions in those
circumstances in which the political process is least likely to check con-
gressional decisionmaking.
In short, understanding immunity as a means to protect the politi-
cal process makes sense of much of the patchwork waivers that cur-
rently exist. In addition, a process perspective provides a lens with
which to assess the desirability of rescinding sovereign-immunity rules
completely.
II. STRUCTURAL PREDICATE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Sovereign immunity can be understood as turning on structural
separation-of-powers principles of sound governance. Although much
ink has been spilled justifying or decrying judicial review of constitu-
tional questions, 2 comparatively scant attention has been paid to judi-
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988).
12. See, for example, Symposium on Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 Va. L.
[Vol. 45:15291534
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cial review of policymaking in the more pedestrian tort and contract
contexts. Yet similar questions of institutional competence and defer-
ence to majoritarian authority exist. Because judicial review at times
may frustrate Congress's policymaking efforts and possibly may arro-
gate too much of a policymaking function to the judiciary, separation-
of-powers concerns suggest that Congress should retain virtually unfet-
tered responsibility to determine when to waive immunity for itself or
its delegates in the executive branch. Congress's control over the waiver
decision parallels its plenary control over causes of action, jurisdiction
of courts, and the like. To that extent the doctrine of immunity is
rooted in the Constitution-Congress and the executive branch can be
sued only if Congress permits.
In its exercise of discretion over the waiver decision, Congress
might retain immunity for a number of reasons. First, Congress might
determine that suit over certain legislative and executive branch actions
either would be inefficient or impolitic. There is no need here to replay
the ongoing debate over a theory supporting judicial review of constitu-
tional questions. Suffice it to say that the justification for judicial re-
view is at its nadir when judges supplant the policymaking of the
majority.13 Indeed, there is presumably less justification for judicial re-
view of policymaking in the tort and contract contexts than in the con-
stitutional setting. Commentators have justified judicial review of
constitutional claims by virtue of our system of checks and balances.1
From this perspective, judges play a critical role in counterbalancing
legislative and executive power through their exercise of judicial review
to protect structural guarantees. Review of contract and tort challenges
is presumably less critical to maintaining a balance of powers among
the branches. Justification for judicial review also lies in the need to
protect individual liberties. Yet, the rights at stake in common-law ac-
tions by definition are less fundamental than those enshrined in the Bill
of Rights. 15 A legislator, therefore, generally has the discretion under
our system to act reasonably or unreasonably, to follow prior commit-
ments or to change them. The only check on these actions is at the
ballot box. It is hardly surprising that Congress has never authorized
courts to scrutinize legislation for conformity to common-law tort and
Rev. 631, 631-879 (1991).
13. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 43-72 (1980); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling
Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 Va. L. Rev. 747, 768-88 (1991).
14. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: Foreword: The Vanishing Consti-
tution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43 (1989); Miller, 8 Social Phil. & Pol. at 196 (cited in note 9).
15. On the other hand, Congress can override prospectively any judicial determination that a
certain course of legislative conduct is negligent, or that a certain legislative agreement is uncon-
scionable. These safeguards make judicial review more defensible.
1992] 1535
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contract standards. The lawsuits themselves would be costly and the
disruption of the legislative process palpable.
Congress itself does not formulate all national policy, however; it
delegates some of that responsibility to agencies in the executive
branch. At times, Congress has provided for judicial review of agency
policymaking to ensure that its delegates are more accountable for their
formulation of subsidiary policy. Nevertheless, Congress may determine
that judges are institutionally ill-equipped to secondguess some policies
formulated by the executive branch, either because of efficiency con-
cerns or fear of judicial errors. 16 Congress explicitly has precluded judi-
cial review in many such instances.11 Sovereign immunity, therefore,
allows Congress to immunize the executive branch from any judicial re-
view when the costs of such review are too great. 8
Second, even if Congress permits some judicial review, it may fear
that judges will impede policymaking if the standard of review effec-
tively permits them to secondguess the coordinate branches. Reviewing
certain executive branch actions or omissions for negligence under a
reasonableness standard, for instance, would allow courts considerable
power. In defining reasonableness, courts could shape public policy in
critical ways to a much greater extent than they can under the APA.'9
16. Similarly, the political question doctrine is predicated in part on the belief that the costs
of reviewing certain sensitive executive branch decisions are too great. For example, judicial deci-
sions may embarrass the conduct of foreign relations, especially since judges do not enjoy any
comparative expertise in evaluating such issues. As a result, judges rarely review the President's
decision to commit troops abroad or the wisdom of CIA operations. See Crockett v. Reagan, 720
F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (dismissing challenge to activities in El Salvador); Sanchez-Espinoza v,.
Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 198) (same for Nicaragua); Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324
(D.D.C. 1984) (same for Grenada), appeal dismissed, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Contrast Del-
lums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990) (challenging President's infringement of congres-
sional warmaking power not a political question). If individual liberties questions are presented,
however, the courts may adjudicate the claims. See, for example, Ramirez de Arellano v. Wein-
berger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
See generally Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political
Question Doctrine, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 643 (1989); J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political
Question Doctrine, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97 (1988); Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question"
Doctrine?, 85 Yale L. J. 597 (1976) (criticizing current doctrine); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Re-
view and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1031 (1985) (same).
17. The APA preserves Congress's ability in appropriate cases to preclude judicial review of
administrative action. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1988). See, for example, NLRB v. United Food & Com-
mercial Workers) Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112 (1987) (holding decision by general counsel of the
NLRB statutorily precluded from review); Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340
(1984) (precluding review of milk marketing orders at the behest of consumers); United States v.
Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201 (1982) (precluding review of certain benefit determinations under
Medicare).
18. Those costs might arise either because of judicial errors or because of the impact of judi-
cial review on the government's primary conduct.
19. Even under the more deferential standard of the APA, judicial review arguably has im-
posed a tremendous cost in terms of skewing the agency's allocation of resources. See generally R.
1536
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The judiciary could become the final arbiter of "good" government.2 0
Third, Congress may wish to avoid the potential for judicial intru-
sion that would result if judges or juries21 could impose damages against
the government. The potential to incur damages in the tort context, for
example, may discourage the government from acting,22 particularly
given that the government rarely receives a direct financial reward for
effective regulation or administration.23 At a minimum, the prospect of
liability might induce risk-averse officials to incur excessive costs justi-
fying their actions, 24 or conform any initiatives to the known policy
preferences of judges that are likely to hear challenges.
Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act (Brookings Inst. 1983);
Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle
Safety, 4 Yale J. Reg. 257 (1987).
20. Note that this concern does not arise in the contract context because the government
itself agrees to the standard under which the contract will be judged. In other words, the govern-
ment and not a judge or jury imposes the duties that government officers must follow.
21. Historically, individuals have not enjoyed a jury trial right against the government, and
even today there are few instances in which juries determine the United States' liability. See gen-
erally Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
22. Injunctive relief is not available against Congress. Nor is a specific performance option
available against agency officials. Injunctive relief is not relevant in the tort context, unless the
tortious conduct is ongoing.
23. Whether imposed directly against government officials or the government itself, damage
awards can interfere with government policymaking. Awarding damages against members of Con-
gress or government officials in their individual capacities (primarily for tort suits) might affect
government behavior more radically. Fear of incurring personal liability may chill even the most
responsible government official from taking vigorous action. The possibility of indemnification or
other contractual agreements such as insurance may minimize the deterrent value of the tort suit
against government officials, though officials may still be deterred if the prospect of indemnity is
uncertain, or if the officials need to expend funds to defend themselves prior to the indemnity
decision. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government 89-98 (Yale, 1983).
Imposing liability directly on the government instead may still alter governmental conduct,
although not as noticeably as might a system of official liability. Even though our legal system
allows the government to shift costs of tort or contract judgments to taxpayers, that cost spreading"
may lessen the amount that politicians can hope to obtain from taxpayers for other purposes.
Although most damage awards come from the judgment fund, agencies may suffer various reper-
cussions from high damage awards, such as reduced budgets or other forms of discipline from
either Congress or the Office of Management and Budget. The very existence of many lawsuits
may hamper the effective workings of Congress or an agency because of the need to prepare and
defend against lawsuits. Government officials and members of Congress in turn may seek to avoid
liability even if the damages do not come from their own pockets. Many identify with the govern-
ment's interests as a whole and will try to minimize the government's exposure. Others may be
motivated to avoid liability by more personal incentives, whether to avoid the stigma of being
found liable, or to avoid possible political repercussions.
24. The fear of damage suits might prompt members of Congress or agency officials to wrap
themselves in paper work as a means of insulating themselves from liability. Creating a paper trail
itself delays government action and adds to the cost of enforcement. The Food & Drug Adminis-
tration, for example, might fail to evaluate new drugs expeditiously for fear of incurring govern-
mental tort liability, even though the public as a whole may suffer from the delay. The resulting
bias towards inaction would be understandable, yet detrimental to effective government. See
Schuck, Suing Government at 76; Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1110, 1140 (1981); Jerry L. Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
In the contracts context, members of Congress arguably should be
free to revise agreements entered into by prior Congresses without indi-
vidually or institutionally compensating all parties whose expectations
are sundered. Sovereign immunity not only protects against judicial ag-
grandizement, but more directly against the grasp of prior politicians.
In the absence of immunity, policymakers leaving office might attempt
to bind their successors to prior policy-whether in road construction,
military procurement, or social insurance programs-by entering into
long-term contracts. The prospect of sizeable damage awards could
force contemporary lawmakers to adhere to the terms of prior govern-
mental agreements, impairing the ability of contemporary government
leaders to fashion policy responsive to current social needs and priori-
ties. Retained immunity promotes the accountability of Congress by
limiting the influence of the unelected judiciary and the now unac-
countable policymakers of the past. Public policy at times requires that
policymakers pursue governance free from the constraint of potential
damages.
Despite the possible justifications for continued immunity, it may
seem odd that Congress in essence monitors its own conduct by deter-
mining when waiver is appropriate. To some extent, that apparent con-
flict of interest is inherent in our constitutional structure. Judges judge
judges,25 and the executive branch enforces the law with respect to its
own officers. 26 If another branch determined when Congress waived im-
munity, it might gain too much influence over congressional affairs.
Perhaps more importantly, the decision whether to waive immunity it-
self represents significant public policy. For instance, Congress may
benefit financially by waiving its contract immunity and thereby en-
couraging responsible contractors to do business with the government
at affordable prices.2 7 Although congressional decisions to retain immu-
nity are subject neither to bicameralism nor presentment, Congress is
subject to pressure from affected constituents and concerned interest
groups. Thus, Congress's control over immunity should be no more sur-
prising than its control over ethics laws, discrimination laws, or any
Rights and Official Accountability, 42 L. & Contemp. Probs. 8, 26-28 (1978); William J. Stuntz,
Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 Va. L. Rev. 881, 903-05 (1991) (addressing prob-
lem in law enforcement context).
25. See, for example, United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 211-17 (1980) (holding that judges
may determine compensation clause challenge to statute reducing their own salaries).
26. See, for example, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that executive branch
enjoys constitutional authority to enforce the law with respect to itself).
27. Because one Congress cannot compel future Congresses to waive their immunity, the gov-
ernment may not have the capacity to enter into long-term contracts as effectively as can private
parties. See text accompanying notes 123-34.
1538 [Vol. 45:1529
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other critical social issue facing both the government and the nation as
a whole.
Of course, tort liability in particular can frustrate the policymaking
of private entities as well. Many corporate leaders have complained vig-
orously that the common-law tort system has stymied their ability to
lead their corporations effectively. In fact some have attempted to shed
the burden of prior contracts by finding refuge in bankruptcy.28 Unlike
the government, however, such officials presumably are motivated al-
most exclusively by profit maximization, and the profits they gain may
counterbalance the damages they must pay. Even if government offi-
cials are not selfless public servants, they rarely act for personal pecuni-
ary gain. And while what is good for Exxon or General Motors may in
fact be good for the country, the very purpose of government is to act
for the public good, including regulating the activities of Exxon and
General Motors when needed. In light of this purpose, we are logically
more concerned when the judiciary secondguesses government policy
than when it impinges on corporate expertise.
Moreover, the government is less likely to internalize the costs of
private damage awards than is a private entity. As a non-profit-maxi-
mizing actor, the government does not respond as directly to monetary
signals. The government can rationalize damage awards as a cost of
public policy; further, damage awards against the government as a
whole may have little appreciable effect upon the actions of lower level
agency officials. Thug, sovereign immunity reflects not only that judicial
secondguessing is more intrusive in the public than in the private sec-
tor, but also that tort liability is less likely to compel internalization in
the public sector.
The question remains, however, whether the potential costs of judi-
cial review of government torts and contracts outweigh the benefits de-
rived from such judicial oversight. Tort and contract actions may deter
the government from carelessness or from pursuing inefficient procure-
ment policies, but our political system was designed in part to safe-
guard the content of public policy. The web of checks and balances
ensures that government officials set public policy in a visible, well-ven-
tilated manner, and that several different branches influence its ulti-
mate content. Before Congress can legislate, both the Senate and House
of Representatives must agree and then expend the requisite political
capital to present that agreement to the President for his approval.29
28. Compare NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1983) (holding that petition in
bankruptcy may excuse company from honoring obligations under collective bargaining
agreement).
29. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 23.
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The framers hoped that such leavening would enhance the likelihood of
public-spirited legislation.30 Congress has plausible justification at times
for relying on political checks to circumscribe its own conduct instead
of exposing its policymaking to private monitoring.
The administrative process is similarly designed to minimize rent-
seeking or opportunistic behavior.3' Agencies generally issue regulations
only after a series of internal meetings, after affording notice-and-com-
ment procedures to solicit the viewpoints of interested private parties,
and after considering Congress's anticipated response.3 2 This is not to
suggest that policy emerging from either the legislative or administra-
tive process is always wise, but rather that, when the political process
serves to check government wrongdoing, Congress might conclude ra-
tionally that the gains from private damage actions are unlikely to ex-
ceed their costs to the political system.
In contrast, the policy pursued by corporations is not checked di-
rectly by the political process. Corporations are responsible primarily to
their shareholders, not the public. Moreover, even if shareholders could
control the corporate managers effectively, they are unlikely to deter
corporate misfeasance in light of their own financial interest. Congress
itself can check corporate wrongdoing through regulation. But Congress
cannot scrutinize the policy set by every corporation throughout the na-
tion. Furthermore, the electorate does not hold Congress as responsible
for General Motors' misfeasance as it does for the government's own
negligence.33
Unlike private entities, therefore, the government acts subject to
considerable political checks and balances. When those checks operate
effectively, the benefits from the external monitoring of a tort or con-
tract action are likely to be less significant than in the private sector,
and the harm to policymaking is likely to be greater. The doctrine of
30. See generally Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787
(Univ. of North Carolina, 1969). In addition, when that political process appears skewed, courts
have scrutinized independently Congress's decision not to-waive immunity under the Takings
Clause. The propriety of sovereign immunity can be assessed only within the framework of that
Clause, and although the breadth of that safety net is open to continuing dispute, it plainly serves
as a judicial check on government action. Sovereign immunity, in other words, has never been
absolute because the Takings Clause limits its force. See text accompanying notes 186-95.
31. Whether the administrative or political process can limit effectively the influence of in-
terest groups is a different story. But even those who do not trust the political process to police
government conduct might agree that waivers of sovereign immunity largely occur when govern-
ment conduct is relatively unchecked by the political process.
32. See Peter Strauss, An Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United States 161-
63, 206-10 (Carolina Academic Press, 1989).
33. Both corporate and government conduct is checked to some extent by market forces. To
the extent that Ford received bad press for the Pinto, it sells fewer cars. Similarly, to the extent
the government negligently performs services, it may have a harder time raising taxes.
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sovereign immunity allows Congress to protect the political process and
rely on that process, instead of common-law actions, to deter govern-
ment wrongdoing.
III. WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY IN TORT
Congress has never waived its own immunity from either injunctive
or damage actions in tort. Congress may act in an unreasonable manner
or unreasonably fail to act and escape any judicial scrutiny. Under our
system of separated powers, the result could not be otherwise. If judges
could assess damages against Congress as a whole or members of Con-
gress individually, their influence over national policy would rise expo-
nentially. The savings-and-loan fiasco is a case in point. Arguably,
members of Congress acted negligently (if not worse) in failing to take
steps to curtail the crisis earlier, and some of the steps Congress did
take may have worsened the crisis.3 4 For judges to award damages
based on that negligence, however, might not only precipitate a fiscal
nightmare, but it also would allow judges to secondguess the wisdom of
congressional efforts. Challenges to legislative omissions or failures to
act would allow reviewing courts even greater leeway to secondguess
legislative priorities. Congress would need to cater to the individual pol-
icy preferences of judges to avoid possible liability.
3 5
Moreover, imposing damages upon either Congress or its members
without Congress's consent might have a chilling effect upon future leg-
islative conduct. For fear of incurring liability, Congress might pursue
only the most cautious steps in fashioning public policy or invest in
costly precautions to protect itself from adverse judgment. Congress
'also might leave some areas unregulated. 6 To be sure, judicial review
would not always frustrate policymaking. For instance, a suit predi-
cated upon failure to process private bills might not overdeter future
congressional efforts or afford the judiciary too much influence in legis-
lative affairs. And some judicial review might spur Congress to more
conscientious efforts. But those instances are probably the exception,
and the costs of allowing judges to carve out those exceptions are high.
34. See generally John Greenwald, No End in Sight, Time 50 (Aug. 13, 1990); Marc Levin-
son, Why Our Banks Are Hurting, Newsweek 42 (Jan. 21, 1991); Steven V. Roberts, Villains of the
S&L Crisis, U.S. News & World Rep. 53 (Oct. 1, 1990).
35. Note that even with sovereign immunity, if Congress passes a statute expropriating pri-
vate property, then judges under the Takings Clause may assess damages. See text accompanying
notes 186-96. Congressional negligence leading to destruction of that same property, however,
probably would not violate the Takings Clause.
36. See text accompanying notes 23-24. Although those opposing government in general
might welcome the force for conservatism, permitting such suits might skew congressional priori-
ties in ways unpalatable to many. Indeed, Congress conceivably might leave some areas regulated
that otherwise would be deregulated.
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Congress thus is on solid ground in retaining immunity for itself
and its members from tort suits based upon legislative action or inac-
tion.s7 The immunity rule plausibly can be explained as an effort to
protect the political process. The political process, in turn, molds the
legislature's product, minimizing the need for external monitoring. The
potential harm from judicial oversight likely eclipses any incremental
gains from the added deterrent of a tort action.
Congress has delegated a considerable degree of its own power to
agencies within the executive branch. Agencies, like Congress, fashion
policy that binds the nation. Permitting judicial oversight of executive
branch policy decisions through a tort suit likewise could frustrate
agency policymaking, although the political checks restraining arbitrary
conduct operate less effectively than at the congressional level.
3 8
Because the constraints on agency action cannot be trusted fully,
Congress has subjected much agency policymaking to judicial review
under the APA and other statutory review provisions.39 Congress has
authorized judges to secondguess complex agency policy, even when
subject to the political process. Judicial review circumscribes the discre-
tion of agency policymakers. Congress has not fully waived its dele-
gates' immunity from tort suits. Permitting damage actions at the
behest of private parties, however, arguably would threaten to skew
agency policy more dramatically than would APA review.
40
In contrast to APA review, the judiciary's power to impose dam-
ages for "unreasonable" agency conduct stands as a powerful incentive
37. The Supreme Court on occasion has alluded to the separation-of-powers underpinnings
of immunity from tort actions. For instance, in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980),
the Court stated that common-law immunity for municipalities in part was grounded on the con-
cern that "[f]or a court or jury, in the guise of a tort suit, to review the reasonableness of the city's
judgment on these matters would be an infringement upon the powers properly vested in a coordi-
nate and coequal branch of government." Id. at 648. But the Court asserted that its reasoning was
"grounded not on the principle of sovereign immunity, but on a concern for separation of powers,"
as if the two doctrines could be so separated. Id.
38. Congress in one sense remains accountable for its policy decision to delegate authority. If
Congress abuses that authority, voters may trace that abuse to the legislative delegation. One can
argue that no judicial review of agency policymaking is appropriate. Yet Congress does not stand
as accountable in the public eye for delegated authority, and indeed that lack of accountability is
one key reason why Congress chooses to delegate its authority. See Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gell-
horn, and Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1982).
Thus, most commentators welcome judicial review of agency policymaking, at least in the APA
context, because the political checks on such policy, while significant, do not compare to the checks
on congressional policy itself.
39. See, for example, Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), (b) (1988).
40. Review under the APA is quite deferential both as to questions of law and fact. See
generally, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Moreover,
even when judges determine that agency policy is arbitrary, the agency is free to reformulate that




to agencies to conform their conduct to whatever the judiciary will
likely deem reasonable. Not only could the judiciary disagree with the
agency, as it currently can do through APA suits, but that potential
disagreement could affect the agencies more because of the prospect of
substantial damage awards. Some judges, for instance, might find that
the FDIC's regulation of particular thrifts are unreasonable, and that
prospect may chill or overdeter government enforcement efforts. The
costs and course of agency deliberations might change considerably.
41
Moreover, review of administrative action through tort likely would
be biased because of the presence of a concrete injury that predisposes
the decisionmaker to finding the action wrongful.42 Review of policy
cannot proceed as in the more detached context of an APA suit.43 Thus,
Congress's decision to subject agency policy to judicial review under the
APA instead of through tort suits is not surprising.
Not all agency actions, however, clearly reflect public policy. Judi-
cial review of the reasonableness of a particular employee's driving44 or
of a government physician's failure to remove a sponge from a patient's
abdomen after surgery 5 would not elevate judges into a policymaking
role. Although Congress may recognize that the threat of damages likely
will affect government employees' conduct, it might conclude that such
an effect is beneficial in forcing the employee to take reasonable precau-
tions before acting. In other words, the error costs of judicially deter-
mining what is reasonable are modest when policy considerations are
not directly at stake, or the cost may be more palatable given the ab-
sence of other constraints on such government conduct. Review is less
likely to interfere with the political process and judges probably have
greater institutional competence in assessing the negligence of fact-spe-
cific conduct than in evaluating government-wide policy.46 Congress
41. To the extent that the tort system malfunctions, there may be additional reasons to fear
subjecting agency policy to review in such a forum. See, for example, Ronald A. Cass and Clayton
P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense: Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 Va. L.
Rev. 257, 276-87 (1991) (summarizing imperfections of monitoring through private tort actions).
42. Ronald A. Cass, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
in II Administrative Conference of the United States: Recommendations and Reports at 1503,
1519 (1987) (Consultant Report to the 1987 Administrative Conference of the United States).
43. Id. at 1519.
44. Harper v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (finding Army driver negli-
gent when he did not proceed through intersection in a careful and prudent manner); Frankel v.
Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972) (finding government driver negligent for travelling at excessive
speed).
45. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. United States, 511 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding
government surgeon negligent in leaving sponge in patient's abdomen, but recovery barred because
injury was incident to service).
46. Courts, at the behest of shareholders, analogously have declined to secondguess business
decisions of corporations. The complexity of any investment decision, like formation of govern-
ment policy, makes judicial review extremely problematic. The general rule long has been that, in a
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readily might conclude that judicial review of some torts committed by
administrative personnel does not threaten majoritarian policymaking.
Congress's waiver of the executive branch's immunity for garden
variety tort claims is perhaps less surprising than the delay itself-the
FTCA was not enacted until 1946.41 The FTCA subjects the federal
government to liability to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances.48 In addition, the law of the forum in which the tor-
tious conduct occurred governs the action.49 Accordingly, if a private
driver would be negligent under state law so would the operator of a
postal truck, and if a private physician would be liable for malpractice
under state law, so would a physician at a veterans hospital. Congress,
however, did not provide for the full measure of common-law relief.
The FTCA does not allow punitive damages or prejudgment interest,50
and Congress has provided only for bench trials."
derivative shareholder's suit, "[q]uestions of policy of management, expediency of contracts or ac-
tion. . . may not be questioned [by a court], although the results show that what [the corporation]
did was unwise or inexpedient." Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 100 N.E. 721, 724 (N.Y. 1912).
47. 60 Stat. 842 (1946), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988). Congress in 1920 waived the
government's immunity to victims of maritime torts under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 741-752 (1988), and allowed department heads to settle claims for property damage not exceed-
ing $1000 two years later, Act of Dec. 28, 1922, ch. 17, 42 Stat. 1066, codified at 31 U.S.C. § 216,
repealed by the Act of May 9, 1945, ch. 135 § 3, 59 Stat. 225.
With such exceptions, those injured by the government's tortious acts before 1946 could seek
political redress only through the cumbersome mechanism of private bills-legislation awarding
compensation to individuals because of their injuries received. See 28 U.S.C. § 2509 (1988). The
private bill mechanism became quite unwieldy in the face of increased claims against the federal
government and competing claims on Congress's time.
Congress has waived (or conditionally waived) its tort immunity in other statutes as well as in
the FTCA. See, for example, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3702 (1988) (compensating for property damage
sustained by military personnel incident to service); 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-363 (1988) (waiving immu-
nity in part for military personnel for personal injury or death incident to service); id. § 236 (limit-
ing certain claims against Veterans Administration for accidents overseas).
48. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1988).
49. Id.
50. Id. §§ 2674, 2402. Perhaps Congress determined that the full measure of damages was not
needed either to compensate deserving victims of government negligence or to force the govern-
ment to internalize the costs of its actions, or perhaps it concluded that the public fisc required
that extra protection. Minimizing the amount of damages awarded may protect as well against an
activity-level effect. See text accompanying notes 62-69.
51. Prior to the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988
("FELRTCA"), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 831(c)(2) (Supp. 1990)
and scattered sections of Title 28, injured parties could sue government employees for common-
law torts, but a litigant's choice of the United States as a defendant under the FTCA barred
further recourse against the individual government employee. Plaintiffs could recover from a gov-
ernment official individually even if a claim against the government would be barred by an FTCA
exception. The government employee, however, was protected under a judicially crafted official
immunity doctrine for any common-law tort involving a discretionary decision arising out of the
scope of employment. See also text accompanying notes 110-122.
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More importantly, Congress refused to enact a blanket waiver in
the FTCA, enumerating numerous exceptions.5 2 In large part, those ex-
ceptions serve to protect majoritarian policy from secondguessing. For
instance, the FTCA excludes claims "arising out of the combatant ac-
tivities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time
of war."' 53 Congress apparently determined that military activities in
time of war should not be conducted under the shadow of possible dam-
age relief. Similarly, Congress exempted "any claim for damages caused
by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine," and "any claim for
damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regu-
lation of the monetary system. 5 4 Permitting suit in these contexts sim-
ilarly could impede governmental policymaking.
More generally, Congress excluded from the Act any claim "based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused,'55 and most intentional torts, including claims grounded in the
misrepresentation of a government employee.5 6 The discretionary func-
tion exception, and to some extent the misrepresentation exception,
protect agency policymaking from the potential intrusion of damage
awards.
A. Discretionary Function Exception
Despite the various formulations that courts have used in applying
the discretionary function exception, 7 Congress's articulation of the ex-
ception unquestionably helps preserve majoritarian policy. Judges can-
not secondguess the discretionary functions of government officials
through tort suits without substantially interfering with executive
branch policymaking. That policymaking is checked by the political and
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (1988).
53. Id. § 2680(j).
54. Id. § 2680(f), (i).
55. Id. § 2680(a).
56. Id. § 2680(h). Under the FELRTCA, injured parties cannot sue individual government
officials even if an FTCA exception bars their claim against the United States. See text accompa-
nying notes 117-21.
57. At times, courts have suggested that the discretionary function exception protects the
discretion implicit in discharging all uniquely governmental functions, see Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 43-44 (1953), in carrying out all regulatory programs of government, see Cun-
ningham v. United States, 786 F.2d 1445, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986), in formulating all governmental
decisions at the planning, as opposed to the operational, stage, see Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 35-36, and
most recently, in protecting all governmental decisions grounded in social, economic, or political
policy, see United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267, 1273 (1991) (protecting actions of bank
regulators in supervising and then taking over failing savings-and-loan association); Berkovitz v.
United States, 486 U.S. 531, 539 (1988); S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. United
States (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984) (protecting inspection strategy).
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administrative processes, which diminish the need for monitoring
through tort actions. The discretionary function exception aims to dis-
tinguish challenges that are tied directly to regulatory initiatives from
garden variety claims that implicate few policy concerns other than pro-
tecting the federal fisc. 5s As discussed previously, the prospect of a
damage award might overdeter agency policymakers, curbing their re-
sponsiveness to public concerns.59
Moreover, subjecting agency policy to damage awards under the
FTCA also might impede agency policymaking for reasons peculiar to
the structure of the FTCA. First, because the FTCA subjects executive
branch officials to liability under state law, state law would trump fed-
eral policies in the absence of the exception. For instance, in S.A. Em-
presa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandese v. United States (Varig
Airlines),60 the court of appeals, applying California law, held that the
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") was negligent in delegating
its responsibility to regulate airplane safety to aircraft manufacturers
and in monitoring compliance with safety standards through a spot-
check system. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the discre-
tionary function exception precluded suit because the decision to spot
check was "grounded in social, economic and political policy," namely,
how best to allocate resources to ensure safety.6 1 Otherwise, California's
good samaritan law would have undermined the supremacy of federal
agency policymaking.
Second, because Congress predicated the FTCA on state law, judi-
cial review under the FTCA subjects federal agencies to inconsistent
standards throughout the country. For instance, while California im-
posed a duty to do more than spot check when conducting aircraft
58. The legislative history of the discretionary function exception is not illuminating. Clearly,
however, Congress's intent was to protect executive branch policy. The FTCA's antecedents rested
in various prior doctrines protecting the government: judicial reluctance to issue writs of manda-
mus against officers discharging discretionary government tasks, see, for example, Kendall v.
Stokes, 44 U.S. 87 (1845); judicial elaboration of common-law immunities for government officials,
see, for example, Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895); and municipal tort immunity for exercise
of governmental functions, see, for example, Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 (1877).
As the House Report accompanying the Act explained:
This is a highly important exception, intended to preclude . . . application of the bill to a
claim against a regulatory agency, such as the Federal Trade Commission or the Securities
and Exchange Commission, based upon an alleged abuse of discretionary authority by an
officer or employee, whether or not negligence is alleged to have been involved. To take an-
other example, claims based upon an allegedly negligent exercise by the Treasury Department
of the blacklisting or freezing powers are also intended to be excepted.
H.R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1942).
59. See text accompanying notes 34-43. Moreover, the presence of an injured party in a tort
suit might bias judges against the challenged policy.
60. 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982).
61. 467 U.S. at 814-20.
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safety investigations, another state may have adopted different stan-
dards. Either the FAA would have to abandon its spot-check inspection
program throughout the country because of the uncertainty of where it
might be sued, or it would have to adopt different inspection programs
for different parts of the country at the expense of uniformity and effi-
ciency. On the other hand, if Congress had grounded the FTCA in an
evolving federal common law of negligence, federal judges would have
enjoyed greater power to fashion applicable standards of agency
conduct.
Even without immunizing the discretionary functions of the gov-
ernment, Congress of course would retain the authority to override ad-
verse judicial determinations. If the Supreme Court had decided Varig
Airlines differently, for instance, Congress could have exempted inspec-
tion claims or good samaritan claims from the FTCA, or more narrowly
amended the FTCA to specify that FAA spot checking must be consid-
ered "reasonable." Nevertheless, the possibility of congressional inter-
vention, in all but the most outrageous cases, is quite slim, and the ex
ante impact of damage actions on administrative agencies may be quite
pronounced. In short, Congress's decision to retain immunity from tort
suits challenging the discretionary functions of government helps pre-
serve majoritarian policymaking.
The central inquiry in discretionary function exception cases
should focus on the degree to which the tort claim threatens agency
policy. The discretionary function exception comports with sound prin-
ciples of majoritarian governance only to the extent that it insulates all
agency actions that, like congressional enactments themselves, reflect
national policy. Agency regulations and rules should be protected for,
much like legislation, they are responsive to the democratic process,
and permitting damage actions likely would cause more harm to such
policymaking than good in providing added deterrence. From a process
perspective, the case for protecting agency acts that bear a more tan-
gential relationship to purposeful policy, such as malpractice or traffic
accident claims, is correspondingly less compelling.
62
To some extent, courts have applied a process approach to the dis-
cretionary function exception. Courts routinely have rejected tort chal-
lenges to regulations adopted by agencies, such as the FAA's measures
to promote air safety,63 or the INS's measures to control movement
62. In addition, immunizing such garden variety tort claims might have a distorting effect on
government operations, because the government might retain activities in-house that it otherwise
would contract out in order to take advantage of favorable immunity rules. See Saul Levmore,
Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1333 (1991).
63. Miller v. United States, 522 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1975).
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across our borders.6 4
Courts also have applied the exception to less formal governmental
policymaking. In Dalehite v. United States,65 for instance, the Court
immunized the government for its role in the explosions that levelled
the port of Texas City, Texas in 1947, and caused severe losses of life
and property. As part of the effort to provide food for Europe after
World War II, the United States decided to ship fertilizer overseas. The
fertilizer contained ammonium nitrate, which is highly combustible. Af-
ter fertilizer had been loaded on two ships for transport, a fire started
on one of the ships, apparently igniting the fertilizer and triggering an
explosion.6 6 The Court held that the government's actions, both in for-
mulating the plan to export the fertilizer, as well as in implementing
the plan through packaging, labelling, and shipping directives, were
protected by the discretionary function exception. The Court allowed
immunity despite the fact that government officials plainly were aware,
or should have been aware, of the substantial danger of shipping the
fertilizer under such conditions.6
As long as the challenged action stems from governmental policy,
precluding a tort action will not necessarily remove all incentive for
care. Even in the absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking, agency
policy, in the form of either rules of general applicability or deliberative
decisions made by senior agency officials, is formulated only after much
internal debate and consideration of future ramifications. Its status as
policy ensures a certain visibility that leads to some oversight by Con-
gress and lobbying by interested private parties.
In contrast, nondeliberative actions, whether an employee's opera-
tion of a truck or the malpractice of a physician, generally do not stem
from any prior debate, have not been taken" with an eye to future conse-
quences, and are not subject to ex ante monitoring from Congress, in-
terest groups, or the agency itself.68 In the absence of liability, political
64. Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230 (2d Cir. 1982).
65. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
66. Id. at 22-23.
67. Id. at 37-44.
68. Even in the absence of a tort suit, some ex post review is possible through political pres-
sure. If physician malpractice is widespread, Congress or the VA might institute reforms to mini-
mize recurrences. In addition, victims might gain Congress's ear and receive compensation despite
the absence of a tort suit. Indeed, victims of the explosion in Dalehite exerted sufficient pressure
to spur Congress to pass a relief act, awarding up to $25,000 per person. Texas City Disaster Relief
Act, 69 Stat. 707 (1955).
Yet neither Congress nor agencies stand as responsible in the public eye for the exercise of
authority Congress delegates. Even a policy decision to tolerate negligence by lower level employ-
ees is not as clearly traced to the principal. The attenuated link, in combination with the lack of ex
ante monitoring, suggests the need for some oversight ex post. A tort suit represents an effective
check in this context because it is unlikely to interfere with government policy.
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checks instill more care in deciding whether to ship fertilizer than in
steering the freighter. Indeed, the decision to ship the fertilizer was
reached at the cabinet level, and presumably only after much discussion
of the advantages and disadvantages. Thus, even though application of
the discretionary function exception removes a vehicle for deterring
government accidents, it does so only in contexts in which the political
process already acts as a safeguard.
The government's retained immunity in tort also may be based on
an attendant activity-level effect. For instance, a finding of liability in
Dalehite might have chilled the government's willingness to continue
shipping aid overseas. A comparable finding in Varig Airlines might
have deterred the government from inspecting aircraft at all. But the
activity-level effect justification is limited, for it cannot easily explain
Congress's waiver of immunity for more garden variety torts, which also
have the potential to overdeter the government. Theoretically, imposing
liability upon postal service truck drivers could induce the government
to stop subsidizing mail; the same holds true for imposing liability upon
physicians in veterans hospitals. Yet Congress has waived the govern-
ment's immunity from such tort claims presumably because the gains
from added deterrence outweigh any potential harm stemming from an
activity-level effect. The need to preserve government policy, as op-
posed to government activities themselves, has considerably more ex-
planatory power.
Congress might have sought to protect majoritarian policymaking
through other means. For instance, it could have changed the underly-
ing liability standard of negligence, authorized some form of affirmative
good faith defense, or reduced the availability of damages even further.
Whether such steps would have struck the balance more effectively be-
tween the need to preserve government policy and the need to deter
wasteful conduct is beyond the scope of this Article. My argument is
rather that Congress's decision to immunize the government when in-
ternal checks circumscribe its actions is quite defensible from a norma-
tive perspective.
Nonetheless, recent cases may be overprotective of government
from a process perspective, by failing to force the government to inter-
nalize the costs of its activities in situations in which government policy
is less obviously threatened. In United States v. Gaubert,6 9 the Court
apparently expanded the discretionary function exception to include
not only policy determinations, but also tlose actions of subordinate
agency officials that are "grounded in the policy of the regulatory re-
69. 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991).
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gime," and are "susceptible to policy analysis."" ° Thus, the Court held
that bank regulators in determining the propriety of bank loans and
bank litigation were protected by the discretionary function exception
because the challenged acts were all "susceptible to policy analysis. 7 1
The challenged acts in Gaubert may have been connected inti-
mately to bank policy, as they were intended to revivify failing thrifts.
But the justification for immunizing all government acts merely "sus-
ceptible" of choice or discretion is more elusive.7 2 Consider, for in-
stance, Flynn v. United States,'3 a recent case in which plaintiffs
alleged that members of the National Park Service negligently at-
tempted to restore order at the scene of an automobile accident. 4 Upon
arriving at the scene in the middle of the road, Park Service personnel
activated emergency lights and drove to the side of the road, allegedly
distracting the car behind them which continued ahead and collided
into survivors from the first accident. The Tenth Circuit held that the
park rangers were shielded from liability by the discretionary function
exception.
7 5
As government employees, the park rangers in Flynn were vested
with discretion in responding to emergencies, but their decision to acti-
vate the lights and turn to the side of the road did not stem from any
policy previously formulated. Their situation-specific reactions may
merit exoneration, but not necessarily the cloak of immunity. The
nexus between the challenged actions and purposeful government pol-
icy is simply too attenuated, and even if the employees' decision was
"susceptible to policy analysis," no internal checks safeguarded the
challenged governmental action. To put it another way, the benefits
from judicial review in such contexts are likely to outweigh the harm to
majoritarian governance.7 6
Irrespective of whether or where to draw a line between govern-
ment acts pursuant to policy and those "susceptible to policy analysis,"
the discretionary function exception avoids judicial secondguessing of
agency policy. Formulation of policy is left to the agency itself with
70. Id. at 1275.
71. Id. at 1277-79.
72. Justice Scalia in concurrence also chided the majority for its open-ended approach. Id. at
1281 (Scalia concurring). The majority's analysis may reflect its sympathy with the government's
plight in combatting the savings and loan crisis.
73. 902 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1990).
74. Id. at 1526-27.
75. See also Johnson v. United States, 949 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that park
ranger's alleged failure to rescue mountain climbers protected by exception).
76. For a more thorough articulation of my views concerning the discretionary function ex-
ception, see Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Gov-
ernmental Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 871 (1991).
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congressional supervision and possibly limited judicial review under the
APA. Despite the lack of a damages check, the political and administra-
tive process constrains government policy and minimizes the potential
for arbitrary government conduct.
B. Misrepresentation Exception
The FTCA also retains the federal government's immunity for all
claims arising out of misrepresentations by government officials. 77 Indi-
viduals must rely upon the advice or information conveyed by a govern-
ment agent at their own peril. At first glance, the misrepresentation
exception is unrelated to the process justification for retained immu-
nity. Almost by definition, a misrepresentation, whether intentional or
negligent, does not constitute policy warranting protection.78 In general,
immunity is justified in this area, if at all, only by the fear of overdeter-
rence and attendant activity-level effect. But Congress's decision to re-
tain immunity for the misrepresentations of government agents does
help safeguard public policy in at least two respects.
First, some misrepresentations stem from purposeful policy. Con-
sider, for instance, the facts in Frigard v. United States.7 9 Plaintiffs
invested funds in a firm, which unknown to them allegedly was a cover
for a CIA operation. Plaintiffs asserted that the firm mismanaged their
funds and that, but for the CIA's support of the firm, they would not
have made the investment.8 0 Certainly, the CIA may have misrepre-
sented the company's status, but it presumably did so as part of a care-
fully thought out intelligence operation. The misrepresentation
exception, in part, protects against judicial secondguessing of such pur-
poseful government action. Just as with the discretionary function ex-
ception, deterrence should stem from the political process.
There are undoubtedly few cases in which government agencies
purposefully misrepresent or lie to the public. More often misrepresen-
tation claims sound in negligence. A misleading turn signal that precipi-
tates a car crash can be viewed as either a garden variety tort or as a
misrepresentation of the direction in which the car is heading.8 ' A fail-
ure to warn of known dangers in a federal park can be considered as
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1988).
78. Congress presumably crafted the misrepresentation exception out of general financial
concerns. See, for example, H. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1946).
79. 862 F.2d 201 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Redmond v. SEC, 518 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1975)
(similar facts).
80. 862 F.2d at 202-03.
81. See, for example, United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961) (holding the govern-
ment immune for alleged misrepresentation of Federal Housing Administration appraiser).
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either negligence or an implicit misrepresentation of the park's safety.82
And, as in general negligence cases, some negligent misrepresentations
stem from purposeful government policy. Even after notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking, the Food and Drug Administration may misrepresent
that a certain drug is safe or the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), after considerable study, may misrepresent that a certain type
of treatment facility is effective.83 Immunity is appropriate in such con-
texts to protect the policymaking process.
In general, however, misrepresentations by government officials, in-
tentional, or negligent, do not reflect purposeful policy. Most claims of
government misrepresentation arise out of the government's negligent
dissemination of information, whether by the National Weather Service
(NWS) 84 or by various inspection agencies.85 The process approach can-
not explain immunity for such cases because no governmental policy
per se is at stake, but rather, the judgment of an individual government
employee. Similarly, an inspector's assessment of a home or a contract
officer's estimate of state tax law consequences do not reflect purposeful
policy and set no precedent for future governmental conduct. Few pro-
cess checks safeguard the content of such governmental communica-
tions, for there is generally no way to monitor their substance ex ante.
Like other nondeliberative acts of government employees, misrepresen-
tations can form the basis for suit against the United States without
82. See generally Boyd v. United States ex. rel U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 881 F.2d 895
(10th Cir. 1989). In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), for example, the
plaintiff sued for lost cargo when a tug ran aground allegedly because of the Coast Guard's negli-
gence in failing to repair a lighthouse. The government defended in part on the ground that it was
liable at most for misrepresentation in representing to travellers that the lighthouse was operative.
The Court found the government liable for negligence without even addressing the misrepresenta-
tion argument.
83. See, for example, City of Garland v. Zurn Indus., Inc., 870 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the misrepresentation exception applied to deny a third-party claim against the EPA
for approving plans for sewage treatment facility that, when built, did not work effectively);
Pennbank v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 1573 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (applying misrepresentation excep-
tion when bank lost payments from the Farmers Home Administration and the EPA when a sewer
system that was approved by both agencies failed to operate properly).
84. See, for example, Baroni v. United States, 662 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
alleged failure of the Federal Housing Administration to calculate proper flood height was pro-
tected by misrepresentation exception); Bartie v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. La. 1963)
(holding that alleged failure of the NWS to warn of tidal wave was protected by misrepresentation
exception), aff'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1964); National Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954) (holding that alleged failure of government officials to warn of
flood was protected by misrepresentation exception); Clark v. United States, 218 F.2d 446 (9th
Cir. 1954) (same). See also Mt. Homes, Inc. v. United States, 912 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the failure of the Farmers Home Administration to include proper state tax information on
cost estimate sheets was protected under misrepresentation exception).
85. See, for example, United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961); Block v. Neal, 460 U.S.
289 (1983); Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1981).
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jeopardizing majoritarian governance. Congressional waiver of immu-
nity for such tort suits likely would lead to more benefit in terms of
needed deterrence than detriment in disrupting government policy.
Nonetheless, Congress's decision to retain immunity for such mis-
representation claims might reflect a secondary protection of poli-
cymaking: preserving the government's policy decision to communicate
information in the first instance. One of the chief functions of govern-
ment is to disseminate information, and it may be impossible to pre-
vent employees, at times, from either miscommunicating or failing to
communicate necessary information. Unlike private parties, the govern-
ment may communicate information for a wide variety of reasons unre-
lated to any profit motive; indeed, the poor generally benefit
considerably from such communications."6 Liability might have a
greater effect in the governmental context than in the private sector
because, while entities in both sectors would have to pay damages, the
government generally does not derive a compensating financial benefit
from the effective dissemination of information.
8 7
Retained immunity for misrepresentation claims, therefore, might
be justified if the potential harm of forcing the government to curtail its
activities outweighs the benefits of added deterrence. If damage actions
would curtail advice to the public from the Internal Revenue Service or
Health and Human Services officials, then immunity might be justified.
Similarly, the government might curtail the NWS's activities drastically
if negligent dissemination of information could give rise to a tort suit.8
On the whole, we might be better off by sanctioning government advice
and information without exacting overly stringent controls, for fear of
shutting down or cutting back dramatically on such information
services.
Though plausible, the activity-level effect rationale"9 is not wholly
86. Michael Braunstein, In Defense of a Traditional Immunity-Toward an Economic Ra-
tionale for not Estopping the Government, 14 Rutgers L. J. 1, 32-39 (1982) (arguing that the loss
from chilling government communications will likely eclipse losses from detrimental reliance upon
such communications). Of course, the poor are not the only beneficiaries of government communi-
cations. The wealthy sometimes benefit from free governmental communications as well as from
free advice disseminated by the SEC to corporations or by the Comptroller of the Currency to law
firms and banks. Government officials, in fact, may impart information as a way of incurring con-
stituent support.
87. Some private companies charge directly for dissemination of information.
88. This is not to suggest that, in the absence of the exception, liability necessarily would be
crippling. At common law, all public and private entities disseminating information are immune
from actions for reporting negligent information in the absence of a close relationship to the plain-
tiff. See, for example, De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 148-49 (5th
Cir. 1971). See also W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 109 at 755-65 (5th ed.
1984).
89. See text accompanying note 69.
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persuasive. As an initial matter, predicting whether such an activity-
level effect will arise is quite difficult. In many contexts, the govern-
ment has sufficient incentives to make the representation even if the
prospect of a damages action exists. In United States v. Neustadt,90
plaintiffs relied to their detriment upon an allegedly negligent appraisal
of a Federal Housing Administration inspector, paying in excess of the
appraised property's fair market value.9 1 Because the government
agency backed the mortgage, it seemingly had sufficient incentive to
continue inspections even if it could have been sued.92 In other words,
permitting suit based on misrepresentation may be compatible with im-
plementation and formulation of government policy.
Continued immunity for all government misrepresentations might
not be necessary to protect against an activity-level effect. Every time
the government is liable for a tort under the FTCA, particularly in the
regulatory context, an activity-level effect may arise. Congress has pro-
tected against that consequence to some extent by taking the damages
question out of a jury's hands and by precluding punitive damages.93
While a congressional decision to waive tort liability for misrepresenta-
tions theoretically could induce the government to abandon a particular
policy of disseminating information to the public, such concerns are not
persuasive enough to make the case for blanket immunity.9 4
90. 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
91. The Court ruled that Section 2680(h) encompasses claims arising out of negligent, as well
as willful, misrepresentations and dismissed the claim. Id. at 704-08.
92. In medical malpractice cases, courts have held the exception inapplicable. In Keir v.
United States, 853 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1988), plaintiffs alleged that a government physician misrep-
resented that he was an ophthalmologist when he was only certified as an optometrist. He thereby
induced consent to treatment. The court permitted the misrepresentation claim to proceed. Id. at
410-11.
In Keir, there was scant danger of an activity-level effect; government physicians for many
reasons must communicate their qualifications and status. See also Ramirez v. United States, 567
F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1977) (allowing claim for physician's failure to disclose risk of surgery).
93. Alternatively, Congress could protect against an activity-level effect by waiving immunity
only for misrepresentations that are considered grossly negligent. At common law, for instance,
even good samaritans are shielded only from claims of ordinary negligence, not from assertions of
intentional wrongdoing or gross negligence. Continued limited liability, therefore, might not result
in an untoward activity-level effect. See generally William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Sal-
vors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7
J. Legal Stud. 83, 119-24 (1978). Moreover, even if less information is disseminated as a result of
damages liability, the information should be more credible and might be more efficient in the long
run.
94. It should not be surprising that courts have begun to chip away at the misrepresentation
exception. The Supreme Court in Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. 289 (1983), permitted suit under the
FTCA in circumstances quite similar to those in Neustadt. The plaintiff had received a loan from
the Farmers Home Administration for construction of a prefabricated house. After inspecting the
house three times, agency officials issued a report that the construction was in accord with specifi-
cations. Upon subsequently discovering serious defects, plaintiff sued the agency for failure to con-
duct an adequate inspection and failure to supervise construction of the home. The Block Court
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In sum, Congress's articulation of the misrepresentation exception
reflects concern for protecting policy formulated by the policymaking
branches. Imposing liability for misrepresentations by government
agents might frustrate policy formulated by Congress or the agency, or
might induce those entities to curtail the flow of government informa-
tion. Yet continued immunity for all misrepresentation claims is unjus-
tified from a process perspective because the gains from review of some
misrepresentation claims are likely to exceed any losses stemming from
interference with government activities. 5
C. Bivens Claims
Unlike waivers for actions sounding in tort or contract, Congress
has never waived the federal government's general immunity from dam-
age claims predicated directly upon the Constitution. Constitutional re-
quirements are largely indeterminate and the policymaking branches
cannot be expected to predict or to agree with the content of the Su-
preme Court's continuing constitutional lawmaking. Permitting damage
actions would exact too high a toll in terms of interference with
majoritarian policymaking.
For instance, consider the Federal Communications Commission's
("FCC's") foray into affirmative action policies. The FCC grants a pref-
erence to minorities in considering applications for broadcast licenses. 6
After the FCC began reexamining the controversial policy, Congress
prohibited the FCC from spending any appropriated funds to change
it. "' The point is not whether the FCC preference constitutes good pol-
distinguished Neustadt on the ground that the plaintiff was challenging not only the negligent
communication of information, but also the agency officials' failure to use due care in supervising
construction of her home. Id. at 296-98. The Court explained that the misrepresentation exception
did not shield government conduct inducing reliance, assuming that liability would exist under
state law, but merely the government's negligent dissemination of information. Id. at 298-99. See
also JM Mechanical Corp. v. United States, 716 F.2d 190, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that the
government's misrepresentation that a performance bond had been paid did not preclude suit for
government's alleged failure to procure substitute performance); Cross Brothers Meat Packers,
Inc. v. United States, 705 F.2d 682, 684 (3d Cir. 1983) (allowing claim for negligent grading of
neat by Agriculture Department officials).
95. Similarly, immunity from equitable estoppel claims is unwarranted from a process per-
spective. Congress has declined to waive its immunity for promises of its agents. Yet, a misrepre-
sentation by a governmental agent does not represent government policy and has not been checked
by the political process. Permitting recovery on the basis of agents' misdeeds should spur the gov-
ernment to supervise its agents more effectively. If there were sound empirical reasons to fear
collusion between governmental officials and the public, then protection against the indirect cir-
cumvention of purposeful policy might warrant immunity. Office of Personnel Management v.
Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427 (1990). But in the absence of such data, the justification for contin-
ued immunity remains elusive.
96. See 92 F.C.C.2d 849 (1982).
97. Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat 1329-
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icy or is even constitutional,9 8 but rather that considerations of mini-
mizing damages arguably should not burden formulation of such a
policy. The same can be said of other controversial governmental poli-
cies, from restrictions on funding to hospitals," to restrictions on the
amount of money that veterans can pay attorneys to represent them in
administrative hearings. 100 Congress's decision to retain immunity for
constitutional violations plausibly. preserves majoritarian policy.
Immunity for all constitutional violations, however, is unnecessary
to protect majoritarian policy. In the wake of Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents,'"' in which the Supreme Court implied an
action for monetary damages under the Fourth Amendment against
federal officials in their individual capacities, 10 2 Congress waived the
government's immunity from damage actions arising out of certain con-
stitutional violations. In response to publicity surrounding several noto-
rious raids by federal law enforcement personnel, Congress in 1974
authorized suit under the FTCA for Bivens claims as well as some in-
tentional torts based upon acts or omissions of investigative and law
enforcement officers.'03 Congress's choice to waive immunity for Bivens
actions only with respect to law enforcement personnel suggests Con-
gress's fear that waiving the government's immunity completely would
have an untoward impact upon policymaking.
Congress's limited waiver conforms in part with the process justifi-
31 (1987).
98. The Court surprisingly held that it was constitutional. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
99. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
100. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
101. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Courts have narrowed the scope of the Bivens remedy by circum-
scribing its availability. See generally Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988). The Chilicky
Court stated:
The concept of special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress has proved to include an appropriate judicial deference to indication that congres-
sional inaction has not been inadvertent. When the design of a government program suggests
that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitu-
tional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created addi-
tional Bivens remedies.
Id. at 423. See also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
The Court has not clarified the extent to which Congress can preclude a Bivens cause of ac-
tion. Compare the discussion in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980), which suggests that
the Court will defer to an adequate congressional system of relief, with the more recent discussion
in Chilicky, which indicates that as long as Congress has addressed a general problem, implying a
cause of action is inappropriate.
102. Government officials are protected by qualified immunity, which precludes damages un-
less the officials violated clearly established rights of which a reasonable person should have
known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982).
103. Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). See generally
Jack Boger, Mark Gitenstein, and Paul R. Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional
Torts Amendment: An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. L. Rev. 497 (1976).
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cation for continued immunity. Constitutional violations and inten-
tional torts committed by law enforcement personnel rarely stem from
considered governmental policy, but rather from the situation-specific
reactions of individual employees. Permitting judicial review and dam-
age awards should not impede executive branch policymaking signifi-
cantly. Congress's decision to waive immunity for law enforcement
torts, but not for the torts of other officials, 04 reflects an understanding
that immunity from damage actions is most important when govern-
ment policy that is subject to political checks is directly at stake.
This understanding of Congress's waiver illuminates a controversy
that has arisen under the revised FTCA. Several courts have questioned
whether the discretionary function exception protects the government
from liability for constitutional violations or intentional torts commit-
ted by law enforcement personnel, despite Congress's recent waiver. In
Sutton v. United States,10 5 the Fifth Circuit held that courts must har-
monize the two sections of the FTCA. In Sutton, the plaintiff alleged
that a postal inspector manipulated evidence connected to his investi-
gation of a forged deed and thereby induced several grand juries to is-
sue indictments. The court stated that when the conduct in question is
of the type for which Congress intended to waive immunity by permit-
ting claims for some intentional torts, the discretionary function excep-
tion should not apply. 06 The court then remanded the claim to
determine whether there was in fact a conflict between the two sections
in the case.10 7Although the court's contemplated accommodation is far
from clear, it certainly suggested that the law enforcement proviso
amended in part the discretionary function exception. 08
The process approach, however, suggests that the discretionary
function exception should apply irrespective of the law enforcement
proviso.0 9 If the constitutional violation stems from purposeful policy,
then Congress, consistent with its waivers in related contexts, presuma-
bly intended that the political process take its course. Imposing dam-
104. In Chilicky, for example, the plaintiffs challenged the governnient officials' improper
administration of the social security program. 487 U.S. at 4. Although misguided, the continuing
disability review program reflected purposeful agency policy and ultimately was remedied through
the political process. See Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
460, 98 Stat. 1794 (1984).
105. 819 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1987).
106. Id. at 1300.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1297-98. But see Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the
discretionary function exception applies to Bivens claims).
109. This is not to suggest that the postal inspector's action necessarily warranted protection
under the discretionary function exception, but merely that the court should make such inquiry.
Indeed, a more complete waiver of Bivens claims arguably would not harm policymaking because
of the independent protection provided by the discretionary function exception.
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ages threatens to dampen the ardor and vigor of policymaking. The
touchstone of immunity for constitutional claims, as for common-law
tort claims, may well be the extent to which judicial review would com-
promise or distort public policy and the correlative degree to which
such policy is protected by the political process.
D. Immunity for Government Employees
In addition to determining whether to waive the federal govern-
ment's immunity, Congress must consider the related question of
whether to permit tort actions against individual employees. Immuniz-
ing the government as a whole would not protect the policymaking
branches' interests sufficiently if government employees could be sued
personally. To the contrary, employees might become overly cautious in
formulating and carrying out government policy. Employees do not re-
ceive a direct financial reward for competently executing policy, so a
damage award might skew their behavioral incentives. 110 In order to
continue attracting qualified personnel, the government likely would
have to indemnify such employees for all but the most egregious inci-
dents. If officials are not immune from suit, the exceptions to the FTCA
might lose their protective effect. Judicial crafting of common-law stan-
dards, however, has obviated in part Congress's need to determine the
level of immunity for government employees.
Courts, acting to protect the coordinate branches of government,
generally have held governmental employees immune for any common-
law tort involving a modicum of policy' committed within the scope of
their employment." 2 Just as the discretionary function exception pro-
tects federal government policymaking, so does the doctrine of official
immunity. The ability of government officials to formulate and to im-
plement policy would be disrupted seriously if such officials could be
threatened with personal liability, even if protected through indemnifi-
cation or insurance." 3
On the other hand, governmental policymaking is not as clearly
jeopardized if government employees are sued for nondiscretionary or
110. See notes 23-24.
111. Even Justice Holmes's famous decision denying immunity in Miller v. Horton, 26 N.E.
100 (1891) (finding no immunity for a public health official who destroyed plaintiff's horse unless
the horse was in fact diseased), was overruled in Gildea v. Ellershaw, 298 N.E.2d 847 (1973).
112. See, for example, Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 482 (1896) (holding the Postmaster Gen-
eral immune from a suit challenging his allegedly malicious dissemination of information in con-
nection with his official duties); Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (finding the Acting Director of
Rent Stabilization immune from a libel charge stemming from a communique issued in connection
with his official duties).
113. See note 23.
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situation-specific acts. In Westfall v. Erwin,114 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of the proper scope of official immunity. A civilian
employee at an Army Depot filed a negligence suit against his supervi-
sors, asserting that he had received severe chemical burns because of
the defendants' negligence in storing toxic soda ash. The government
officials defended in part by claiming official immunity. The Court ex-
plained that the purpose of official immunity is not to protect erring
officials, but rather "to insulate the decisionmaking process from the
harassment of prospective litigation."1 5 The Court noted a difference
between discretionary conduct and conduct that is not the product of
independent judgment, as only in the former case can the threat of lia-
bility shackle government operations.116 In rough parallel to the discre-
tionary function exception, official immunity should protect purposeful
decisionmaking and not reactions to situation-specific events. That
decisionmaking, in turn, is checked at least somewhat by the political
process. Even though Congress declined under the FTCA to waive the
government's immunity for intentional torts or misrepresentations, in-
jured parties after Westfall still might obtain redress from an individ-
ual government employee if that employee did not participate in setting
policy.
To ensure that suits against individual government employees did
not jeopardize government policymaking, Congress repudiated Westfall,
conferring absolute immunity upon all government officials for com-
mon-law torts committed within the scope of employment. 1 7 If the At-
torney General certifies that the defendant employee was acting within
the scope of his or her duties, then the United States is substituted as
the defendant, and recourse against the United States is exclusive of
any other remedy.11 8
For example, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Smith" 9
that the new grant of immunity precluded a malpractice suit against a
government physician even when the FTCA exempted such a claim be-
cause the malpractice took place overseas. 120 The Court reasoned that
Congress simply did not manifest much "solicitude for tort plaintiffs'
rights.' 2' The Court explained that claims precluded by the FTCA ex-
114. 484 U.S. 292 (1988).
115. Id. at 296.
116. Id. at 296-97.
117. FELRTCA (cited in note 51).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b), (d) (Supp. 1990).
119. 111 S. Ct. 1180 (1991).
120. The FTCA excludes "any claim arising in a foreign country." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1988).
121. 111 S. Ct. at 1189. See also Nasuti v. Scannell, 906 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1990) (precluding
suit against individual government employee for assault and battery). The Act, however, does ex-
cept any action "which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States." 28
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ception also are precluded against employees.'22
Although there may be sound reasons of governance to shield fed-
eral employees from some tort claims, blanket immunity is difficult to
reconcile with the goal of forcing the government to account for the
costs of its actions. The new legislation deprived plaintiffs of a remedy
even for torts committed by government employees that do not impli-
cate directly government policy and that have not been checked by the
political process. As a result, not only may more injured plaintiffs go
uncompensated, but the government may have insufficient incentive to
supervise its employees as well. That congressional expansion of immu-
nity cannot be reconciled with the process model because separation-of-
powers concerns simply do not require immunizing governmental em-
ployees for most nondiscretionary acts.
IV. WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY IN CONTRACT
Our constitutional system generally immunizes the federal govern-
ment from contract as well as tort claims. As Alexander Hamilton ex-
plained: "Contracts between a Nation and individuals are only binding
on the conscience of the sovereign, and ...confer no right of action
independent of the sovereign will."' 23 Private contracting parties gener-
ally have no recourse against Congress"' or executive agencies for any
breach. Sovereign immunity allows each Congress to determine whether
to honor an agreement made with a prior legislature or agent, free in
most instances from the threat of damages or injunctive relief. Only the
Takings and Due Process Clauses constrain Congress's otherwise unfet-
tered discretion to abandon or unilaterally modify contractual
obligations.
The consequences of continuing immunity are manifest. Private
contractors face continual uncertainty when contracting with the gov-
ernment. Congress or a government procurement officer may reconsider
and revise an agreement without paying full damages. 25 The private
U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) (1988). Congress may have feared that it lacked the power to eliminate Bivens
remedies against federal government officials unless some alternative remedy were available. See
note 73.
122. 111 S.Ct. at 1189-90 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-700 at 6).
123. The Federalist No. 81 at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
124. Congress in large measure is treated like any other contracting party that has the power
to set the terms and conditions of its contractual obligations, including the power to limit its expo-
sure to damage actions. Differences, however, remain. Private parties that limit their own exposure
to damages do so at the risk that courts will find the contract provisions unconscionable, see, for
example, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), or that Con-
gress will intervene in the contracting relationship. More importantly, Congress and government
officials can agree to a particular course of conduct and later breach this agreement without liabil-
ity due to a change in political priorities. See text accompanying notes 154-85.
125. See text accompanying notes 139-73.
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contractor likely will respond by charging more for its services to self-
insure against the possibility that full contract performance will not
occur.
At the same time, immunity prevents Congress from fully precom-
mitting to long-term contractual relationships. Unlike a private party,
Congress cannot pledge to stay its course in the future. Even if the pre-
sent Congress waived immunity for a long-term contract, future Con-
gresses could revoke the waiver just as future Congresses can alter
regulatory programs. All laws, in other words, are subject to change ir-
respective of the wishes of the enacting legislature. As a result, the gov-
ernment has less flexibility in contracting, 126 and must, at least in
theory, pay more for the goods and services it requires. At first blush,
therefore, persistence of sovereign immunity in the contract set-
ting-unlike in tort-seems contrary to the government's interest.
Despite the disadvantages, however, the need to preserve the abil-
ity of future generations to fashion policy responsive to contemporary
majoritarian concerns plausibly justifies immunity. Permitting full
damages might allow current members of Congress and the executive to
"lock in" government policy through contractual arrangements at the
expense of future flexibility. Congress, of course, influences the future
with every step that it takes, whether in domestic or foreign policy, as
the current budget deficit all too plainly attests. Yet, by providing liqui-
dated damages in case of a governmental change in policy (or providing
for specific performance), government leaders could dictate future pol-
icy much more effectively. 127 The temptation to commit the country to
a course that the outgoing policymakers favor might be too strong for
Congress to resist.
Consider that before the Federalists gave up the reins of power in
1801, they attempted to gain control over the federal judiciary by creat-
ing judgeships.' 8 The newly elected Republicans, however, successfully
repealed the Act after they assumed office. Had the Federalists instead
entered into long-term contracts with circuit court executives, the
Republicans might have been stymied in the absence of governmental
126. See generally Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75
Cal. L. Rev. 2005 (1987); Ian E. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Rela-
tions Under Classical, Neo Classical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978).
127. In contrast, continuing immunity rules do not protect the government necessarily from
paying costs imposed by the negligence of prior generations. Government negligence in storing
nuclear waste, for example, may saddle future generations with great clean-up costs. In the ab-
sence of sovereign immunity, however, even if the prospect of tort liability would deter some gov-
ernment wrongdoing, future generations would have to bear costs by paying tort judgments
stemming from the government's prior negligence.
128. Circuit Court Act of 1801, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803).
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immunity. 129 Neither Congress nor the President'"0 should be able to
bargain away the sovereignty of future governments. Sovereign immu-
nity is warranted in the contract context if the harm from allowing one
Congress to bind future Congresses outweighs the benefit from enforc-
ing the government's precommitment to full contractual performance.
Viewed this way, sovereign immunity in contract, like that in tort,
protects majoritarian policymaking. Just as a congressional determina-
tion to enter into an agreement is largely immune from judicial scru-
tiny, so is the congressional decision to terminate that agreement.
As in the tort context, the absence of a damage remedy does not
leave the congressional decision to breach unchecked. There are two
principal constraints. First, bicameralism and presentment must pre-
cede any change in congressional policy, and the administrative process
may mold any change in executive branch policy. Those who stand to
lose from the chaige may utilize political channels to attempt to alter
the government's course, like any other targets of governmental regula-
tion. Although contemporary majorities may find it all too expedient to
renege upon prior obligations, at times the political process constrains
such actions. Second, with each decision to breach, Congress must con-
front the likely consequences of increased prices for future goods and
services, as well as increased difficulty in entering into future long-term
contracts.
On balance, those two constraints demonstrate relatively powerful
reasons to prefer the policy decisions of current, rather than past, legis-
latures. Because our political system tends to submerge future interests,
Congress may decide to conclude a long-term contract without suffi-
cient regard for future consequences. Politicians and their constituents
strive to maximize current benefits. 31 Constituents are generally more
interested in their own welfare than in future generations and they may
discount considerations for future welfare because of their inability to
determine who in fact will be in power a generation hence. For their
part, politicians seek reelection by appearing to respond to constituents'
current needs.
Even if a Congress wished to account for future interests, it likely
129. It seems that by creating new judgeships, the Federalists sought to produce the same
binding effect in light of Article III's Compensation Clause. The Supreme Court, however, was
unpersuaded, at least given the political tenor of the times. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803)
(upholding repeal).
130. See Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees To Insulate
Policies From Political Change, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 295, 319 (concluding that the President
cannot bargain away most attributes of sovereignty).




could not, due to unforeseeable future events.1 32 To be sure, Congress's
repudiation of a prior agreement may discount future interests in en-
hanced bargaining power,13 3 but that repudiation compromises Con-
gress's own ability to enter into long-term agreements and comes at the
political expense of alienating affected contracting partners. The doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, therefore, presupposes a greater trust in
the current process culminating in repudiation, than in the past process
that led to the original agreement.
Private entities, however, frequently find it to their advantage to
enter into long-term contracts, even though they may value short-term
expediency at the expense of long-term gains and cannot foresee the
future. Yet, unlike private entities, Congress's identity and that of the
public as a whole changes over time.13 4 Births, deaths, immigration, and
emigration all transform the political community, resulting in an influx
of newcomers who did not participate in enacting the original congres-
sional agreement. Individuals can bind themselves through contract,
but they generally cannot bind their descendants let alone other third
parties. Although shareholders in a private corporation may also
change, newcomers are not compelled to invest if they disagree with the
company's long-term strategy. Citizens, in comparison, would have little
choice, short of exit, but to live under the long-term contracts made by
prior Congresses. Thus, there is greater reason to permit repudiation of
contractual obligations by the government than by private parties.
Just as important, there is more reason to fear that the private con-
tracting parties, absent the ability to precommit, would abuse a privi-
lege of contractual immunity. Political checks do not constrain private
entities' decisions whether to breach prior commitments, and third par-
ties affected by the decision do not have a say in the corporate decision.
Individual corporations may not be concerned about damaging their
ability to engage in long-term contracts in the future, particularly if
they intend to dissolve or are on the verge of insolvency. A damage
remedy is required to force these private parties to internalize the cost
of breach. In contrast, even if protected by immunity, Congress must
132. Indeed, legislators recognize that, even if they attempt to serve future interests by fol-
lowing a particular course, they cannot ensure that their successors will maintain that direction.
See generally Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 Am. Bar. Found. Res. J. 379 (cogently addressing limits on Congress's ability
to dictate future policy and undo prior policy); Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures:
Of Contracts and the Contract Clause, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 647 (1988) (same with respect to power
of state legislatures).
133. The efforts of some developing nations to repudiate their public debt provide a helpful
analogy.
134. See generally Sterk, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 647.
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expend considerable political capital in disavowing prior commitments
and jeopardize its ability to contract in the future.
The concern for preserving majoritarian policymaking, however,
does not warrant blanket immunity. Continued immunity is warranted
only to the extent that it protects future policymaking. Given that con-
tract liability rests on a judgment that the defendant breached a stan-
dard that the defendant itself helped create, judicial review for
conformance to that standard 13 5 would not interfere unduly with any
policymaking function,3 6 unless the government's reasons for the
breach stem from a desire to change policy in light of new conditions or
political priorities.
Because judicial review of contracting agreements poses less risk to
policymakers than does review of the reasonableness of government or
legislative action, one would expect Congress to permit damage actions
more fully in contract than in tort. One would also expect more exten-
sive waivers of contract immunity because Congress arguably benefits
more from retained immunity in tort than in contract. Congress in fact
has waived the federal government's immunity in contract more com-
pletely, agreeing to pay close to market damages for most garden vari-
ety breaches by executive branch officials.13 7 Yet Congress has not
waived its own immunity from suit, and there remain significant pock-
ets where Congress and the courts will not even hold agency officials
fully to their prior commitments. Unlike in the tort context, however,
courts have secondguessed Congress's repudiation of prior agreements
under the Takings and Due'Process Clauses to ensure that the govern-
ment's breach stems from policy concerns as opposed to sheer
opportunism. 38
A. Liability of Executive Branch for Breach of Contract
Immunity questions often arise in contract claims stemming from
public projects or military procurement. In contrast to tort claims, Con-
gress first waived the executive branch's immunity from contract suit
135. Similai!y, the judiciary reviews governmental action for conformance to applicable rules
and regulations-standards that the government helped set.
136. Third-party review still has the potential to interfere with agency prerogatives. Compare
United States Dep't of Health and Human Services v. FLRA, 844 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (addressing the loss of agency control if third parties review agency's conduct for conform-
ance to applicable rules and regulations).
137. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1503 (1988).
138. In comparison, courts have not superintended Congress's failure to waive immunity in
the tort context, with the exception of claims for expropriated property. There is likely less danger
of "singling out" in the tort context. More important, unlike in tort, courts in the contract context
must decide which congressional policy to honor: the original commitment or the breach. Complete




prior to the Civil War.""9 Although the waiver was not complete in vari-
ous respects, most contractors could assert breach of contract claims in
the specially created Court of Claims.140 The waiver was viewed as in-
dispensable to the efficient operation of government, for without it,
qualified private contractors might not undertake government projects
and the government could not obtain the goods and services it needed
at affordable prices.
Indeed, concerns for majoritarian governance raise no substantial
case for immunizing most contract claims against the executive branch.
Judges generally can determine whether a breach exists without second-
guessing government policy. In construing an ambiguous term in the
contract, for instance, a court would no more threaten agency formula-
tion of policy than it does routinely by construing statutes or agency
regulations. Although some discretion exists in determining whether an
agency has breached a contract, that discretion is likely more canalized
than in determining reasonableness.
Moreover, the mere threat of a damages action generally would not
chill socially useful governmental initiatives. Indeed, the theory of con-
tract damages is in part that a contracting party will breach only when
it is efficient to do so.'4' The threat of damages, therefore, is consistent
with profit-maximizing behavior. If no damages were permitted, govern-
ment procurement officers might engage too readily in opportunistic
conduct. Contractors likely would respond by charging more for the ini-
tial contract. That higher price might limit the amount of goods and
services that the government could obtain, thus increasing the overall
costs of government.
Despite the United States general waiver of immunity from suit for
breach of contract in the Tucker Act,1 42 Congress and the courts have
directed that special contract rules apply to the government, allowing it
to escape the full consequences of a breach in many settings. The gov-
ernment generally need not pay full damages upon terminating a con-
tract for its convenience, 43 nor need it usually pay damages when a
sovereign act of government interferes with the private contractor's per-
139. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612, 614 (1855). See also Act of March 3, 1863, ch.
92, 12 Stat. 765, 768 (1863).
140. For a history of the waiver of executive immunity to contract liability, see Floyd D.
Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution from a Legislative
Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 La. L. Rev. 625, 634-84 (1985).
141. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law at 105-14 (Little, Brown, 3d ed.
1986).
142. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1509 (1988). Congress has waived the government's immunity from
contract suits in particular circumstances as well. See, for example, 41 U.S.C. § 601 (1988); 10
U.S.C. § 2312 (1988) (waiver for military contracts).
143. See text accompanying notes 145-56.
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formance of a government contract.14 4 Yet, regardless of the danger of
inefficient contracting behavior, concerns for majoritarian governance
support the partial continued immunity.
1. Termination for the Convenience of the Government
One of the chief distinctions between the government and the pri-
vate sector is that the government usually can terminate a contract
without cause for the convenience of the government, whether because
of changed needs or different political priorities. 145 Congress, agencies
and courts have limited recovery in various contexts to costs incurred,
profit on work done, and costs of preparing the termination settlement
proposal. 146 Such terminations are not considered breaches of contract
and anticipatory profit is not allowed. Consider a government contract
for natural gas. If the price of natural gas suddenly plummets due to
new discoveries of deposits, then the government presumably could ter-
minate the contract. 4 ' Certainly, the government could terminate the
contract without paying full damages if the government subsequently
decided to implement a new solar energy program.
As a corollary to the termination for the convenience of govern-
ment doctrine, suits for specific performance against the government
are not allowed.' 4s Specific performance would afford private contrac-
tors a weapon to gain relief based on their expectancy interest, and
more importantly, to force the government to expend funds for work it
no longer believes to be in the nation's interests.
Concerns for preserving majoritarian policymaking generally sup-
port these restrictions on contract breach remedies. Congress has been
reluctant to force the executive branch to continue a contract that is no
144. See text accompanying notes 154-73.
145. Almost every major contract now includes a provision allowing termination for conve-
nience of the government. The court in Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756 (Ct. Cl. 1982),
placed some restrictions on the government's ability to terminate contracts, suggesting at a mini-
mum that the government could not avoid its obligation to pay anticipate'd profits when, at the
time it enters into a requirements contract, it realizes that it can obtain an item that the contract
covers for less than the contract price. Termination is appropriate, however, when circumstances
change. See also Salsbury Industries v. United States, 905 F.2d 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The govern-
ment has little incentive to terminate a contract when the contract nears completion. For a history
of the government's right to terminate, see John Cibinic, Jr. and Ralph C. Nash, Administration of
Government Contracts at 817-30 (Geo. Wash. Univ., 2d ed. 2d printing 1986)).
146. See generally Cibinic and Nash, Administration of Government Contracts at 817-19
(cited in note 145). See also Torncello, 681 F.2d at 765; Salsbury, 905 F.2d at 1522.
147. Termination is probably appropriate as long as the sudden drop in prices was unforsee-
able, or at least unforeseen.
148. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949); Transohio
Savings Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 607-11 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (dis-
tinguishing specific relief from specific performance).
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longer deemed in the public interest, because to lock the government
into a contract would tie its hands when flexibility is needed. Payment
of expectation damages might impede officials' willingness to change
policy. Contract rules should not coerce the government into purchasing
more natural gas than necessary. Likewise, if the political priority for
the B-2 bomber changes, as it recently has,149 previously entered con-
tracts may be terminated, subject to payment of reliance damages and
profit on work completed. In turn, although the private contractor may
not receive full contract damages, it generally will anticipate that possi-
bility by raising its bid accordingly," o forcing the government to pay
more for goods and services than would a private entity.' 5'
Congress might well determine that the higher cost of doing busi-
ness may be justified by the need to preserve the government's flexibil-
ity in terminating unwanted contracts. Some inefficiencies doubtless
arise because the government cannot reassure skittish contractors that
it will honor the contract or pay full market damages. But those higher
front-end costs of government contracts may have the salutary effect of
forcing a current administration to assume more of the cost of govern-
ment contracting to prevent it from foisting too many of those costs on
future policymakers. Therefore, the special termination rule not only
protects government flexibility, it also safeguards against government
measures that could mortgage the future.
52
Unlike discretionary function exception cases, however, there may
not be substantial process checks protecting against arbitrary invoca-
tion of the termination provision. Government contracting officers at a
relatively low level may terminate a contract without considerable in-
ternal agency debate, even though regulations differ from agency to
agency.' 53 Nonetheless, the requirement to pay some damages, includ-
149. In his 1992 State of the Union Address, President Bush recommended curtailing the B-2
bomber program substantially. See Boroughs, Carnage on the Coast, 112 U.S. News & World Rep.
58 (May 18, 1992).
150. The contractor, however, probably cannot extract a pledge from the government that if
it terminates the contract, it will pay the contractor liquidated damages. Indeed, courts have per-
mitted the government to terminate contracts for convenience even when no termination clause
was included in the contract. See, for example, G.L. Christian and Assoc. v. United States, 312
F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963); United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321 (1875) (suggesting
that the executive's power to suspend work is inherent in its authority from Congress to enter into
contracts).
151. Alternatively, the prospect of incomplete damage awards might be offset by the security
attendant upon contracting with a party whose financial health, at least in the short term, is not in
question. Compare Eule, 1987 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. at 424 (cited in note 132) (suggesting that
the full measure of damages should be required for all state breaches of contract).
152. The rule of immunity is also important to check the power of congressional agents in
the executive branch. Agency officials cannot easily pledge more to private parties than Congress is
willing to accept.
153. See, for example, 48 C.F.R. § 949.101 (1984) (stating that procurement executive in De-
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ing profit on work performed, and the need to assure a competent pool
of contractors if similar goods or services are desired in the future, min-
imize the potential for abuse. Thus, the failure to waive immunity fully
in the contract context, as reflected in the termination for convenience
doctrine, arguably protects the future flexibility of policymakers when
the potential for wasteful conduct, though it exists, is limited.
2. Sovereign Act Doctrine
In addition to the power to terminate contracts, the government
also may breach any contract due to a "sovereign act" of government."
Unlike contracts between private parties, contracts between the govern-
ment and a private party must be read in the framework of the govern-
ment's sovereign authority. When the government breaches a contract
because of a policy decision, the government is not liable for the stan-
dard common-law measure of damages. The government benefits from
relying upon the sovereign act doctrine, for not only is the government
immune from paying anticipated profits, as it is under the termination
for convenience doctrine, but it also need not compensate the private
contractor for any loss of actual profit sustained due to the sovereign
act.155 As with the termination for convenience doctrine, awarding full
damages or excusing the contractor's performance might make it too
costly for the government to change policy when the public interest so
dictates. Sovereign acts, in other words, like all regulatory exercises of
power, may injure private parties without generally triggering a duty to
compensate. At the same time, as under the exceptions in the FTCA,
sufficient process checks arguably protect against arbitrary government
action.
Although the sovereign act doctrine is controversial, courts for the
last century have applied it consistently. The Supreme Court has ex-
plained that:
The two characters which the government possesses as a contractor and as a sover-
eign cannot be thus fused; nor can the United States while sued in the one charac-
ter be made liable in damages for their acts done in the other. Whatever acts the
government may do, be they legislative or executive, so long as they be public and
general, cannot be deemed specially to . . . violate the particular contracts into
which it enters with private persons. . . . Though their sovereign acts performed
for the general good may work injury to some private contractors, such parties gain
nothing by having the United States as their defendants. 156
partment of Energy must be notified before any termination actions on certain contracts); id. §
1849.102 (stating that headquarters must approve major NASA terminations).
154. The doctrine initially was developed by courts on behalf of the policymaking branches.
See generally Cibinic and Nash, Administration of Government Contracts at 268-71 (cited in note
145).
155. See Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 460-61 (1925); Tony Downs Food Co. v.
United States, 530 F.2d 367, 370-71 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
156. Horowitz, 267 U.S. at 461 (quoting Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383, 384 (1865)).
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For instance, in Atlas Corp. v. United States157 a uranium mining com-
pany alleged that the government breached a fixed price contract for
uranium by passing a statute'58 and implementing regulations 159 requir-
ing all uranium mining companies to stabilize mill tailings-the ore res-
idue after extraction of the uranium. Because of the considerable
expense involved, plaintiff argued that the government breached its
contractual obligation by requiring the company to expend much more
than expected without reimbursement from the government. The court
rejected the breach of contract argument, reasoning that the agency's
imposition of stabilization and disposal requirements constituted sover-
eign acts undertaken for the public good.160
Similarly, in Amino Brothers Co. v. United States'6' the Army
Corps of Engineers contracted with the plaintiff to work on a flood con-
trol project. When the Corps of Engineers released water from flood-
gates at an upstream dam, however, the water washed out plaintiff's
project, causing plaintiff to incur substantial expenses in terms of
materials lost and delay. Plaintiff alleged that the government breached
the contract by interfering with its ability to discharge its contractual
obligations. Nonetheless, the court held that the Army Corps of Engi-
neers was acting in its sovereign capacity by releasing the water up-
stream because its action "affected the public generally and was not
directed solely toward the plaintiff."' 62 Accordingly, the court permitted
no recovery.
Concerns for majoritarian governance support this result. If courts
could impose liability on the government for its sovereign acts, the costs
of compensating private parties for the increased expenses of perform-
ing government contracts might deter the government from effectuating
public policy. Just as Congress and government agencies generally are
immune from any damages caused by their exercises of regulatory au-
thority, whether through zoning, food regulation, or banking oversight,
See also Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Ci. 190, 191 (1865) (stating that "[t]he United States as a
contractor are not responsible for the United States as a lawgiver").
157. 895 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
158. Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act, Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (1978).
159. See 40 C.F.R. § 192 (1991); 10 C.F.R. § 40 (1992).
160. 895 F.2d at 754.
161. 372 F.2d 485 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
162. Id. at 491. If the Corps of Engineers delayed the plaintiff's project directly, then the
court likely would have awarded damages, due to the government's implied duty to cooperate. See,
for example, United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338 (1884); Blinderman Constr. Co. v. United
States, 695 F.2d 552 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Kehm Corp. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 620 (Ct. C1. 1950).




so government agencies are immune from the additional costs imposed
on private contractors by sovereign acts of government.'
Moreover, in the absence of the sovereign act doctrine, procure-
ment officers could impede the policymaking ability of Congress it-
self. 64 Through contracts, administration officials could commit the
entire government to a course of action that Congress subsequently
could not change without paying full damages. Perhaps the government
should pay full damages, but continued immunity is understandable as
a response to the risk that contracting officers or other mid-level ad-
ministration officials will exercise too much control over future policy.
For instance, high interest rates and inflation in the early 1980s
helped precipitate a major crisis in the thrift industry. In response to
this crisis, federal bank regulators in part tried to encourage private
groups to purchase failing thrifts by reducing minimum capital require-
ments and pledging to allow purchasers to include in the capital re-
quirement the amortized goodwill of the acquired thrifts. Several years
later, it became apparent that relaxing capital requirements was a fiasco
that fueled the collapse of the industry. Congress responded in the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act 6 5 by
prohibiting the use of goodwill to meet the capital reserve require-
ments. There would be a significant cost if Congress could not now
change its regulation of thrifts in light of the critical crisis in the
industry. 6
Although the sovereign act doctrine protects government poli-
cymaking, it removes the check on inefficient breaches effected by a
damages action. Yet, to the extent that internal and external political
forces check formulation of government-wide policy, the sovereign act
doctrine is more palatable, for such policy has been leavened through
bicameralism, notice and comment, or other comparable procedures.
The uranium mining companies in Atlas Corp. had significant opportu-
nity to lobby Congress and the concerned agencies prior to adoption of
the relevant requirements. Regulations governing operation of the up-
stream dam in Amino Brothers were announced previously and exposed
to public criticism, particularly from the public living in that general
vicinity.16
7
163. Government agencies are only liable in the rare instance when the regulatory exercise or
contractual breach violates the Takings Clause. See Atlas Corp., 895 F.2d at 756-58 (rejecting a
takings claim).
164. See note 152.
165. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989), codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (1989).
166. Although several district courts initially held that Congress could not alter the contrac-
tual rights of thrifts, the courts of appeal so far have upheld the congressional change. See, for
example, Guaranty Financial Services, Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1991); Carteret Sav-
ings Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision 963 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992).
167. Amino Bros., 372 F.2d 488.
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On the other hand, if the government's act is related more directly
to the contract in question, then such checks are absent. Consider Sun
Oil Co. v. United States.6 8 In that case, the plaintiff oil companies had
obtained a lease from the United States, through the Department of the
Interior, to drill for oil and gas off the coast of California. Plaintiffs
alleged that the Secretary of Interior breached this lease by denying
their application for a permit to install a drilling platform at one key
site. They asserted that the subsequent delay caused substantial dam-
age. The government defended its actions on the ground that overriding
environmental concerns led the Secretary to deny the permit-that the
denial was a sovereign act excusing the breach. The court, however, de-
cided to the contrary, concluding that because environmental concerns
were fully aired before granting the lease, only a substantial showing of
new harms would justify denial of the permit. 169 It reasoned that the
Secretary's actions did not apply to the public generally, but were di-
rected principally at the oil company lessees. 170 The Sun Oil Co. deci-
sion reflects that retained immunity makes the most sense when
political checks protect against wasteful conduct.
Private contractors are unlikely to charge the federal government
significantly more in light of the sovereign act doctrine. They always
confront the risk that new government regulations will make their con-
tractual obligations more expensive to meet. In the uranium case, for
instance, the private contractors would have to assume the extra ex-
pense if new regulations required different safety procedures at the
mining sites, unless they had allocated that expense ex ante.17' If the
contract becomes impossible or at least impracticable to complete, a
different result may follow,' 72 otherwise, private contracting parties in-
168. 572 F.2d 786 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
169. Id. at 815-17.
170. Id. at 817. See also Volentine & Littleton Contractors v. United States, 169 F. Supp.
263 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (closing of flood gates to permit another contractor to work did not constitute
sovereign act); E.C. Ottinger v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 881 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (failing to refer
workers to contractor did not constitute sovereign act). But see Derecktor v. United States, 128 F.
Supp. 136 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (finding that State Department's interference with plaintiff's purchase of
ship from U.S. Maritime Commission was not actionable as breach of contract).
171. Indeed, compensating such parties for the costs of governmental regulation might be
inefficient in that it could induce private contractors to ignore the potential for government regula-
tion and thus to overinvest in a given enterprise. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 520-36 (1986).
172. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 264 (1986) specifically excuses performance if
governmental constraints prevent discharge of contractual obligations: "If the performance of a
duty is made impracticable by having to comply with a domestic or foreign governmental regula-
tion or order, that regulation or order is an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assump-
tion on which the contract was made." See also International Minerals and Chem. Corp. v. Llano,
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jured by changes in governmental regulations have no recourse.1 3
The policy underpinnings to the sovereign act doctrine are thus
discernible. In the absence of immunity, public policy might be
threatened if Congress compensated all those contractually injured by
public policy in one form or another. The prospect of such damage
awards might deter the policymaking branches from revising policy to
meet changing priorities, just as it might if all those injured by new
regulations could similarly recover for any injuries suffered. Further,
full damage awards are not essential to police wasteful government ac-
tivity when existing political checks already constrain public policy.
There is little chance that the government will manufacture a public
policy reason merely to escape from'a losing contract. Finally, the sov-
ereign act doctrine helps preserve majoritarian governance by making it
harder for one administration to bind another. As with the termination
for convenience doctrine, therefore, the benefits from common-law
damage awards-greater efficiency and lower initial contract
prices-arguably do not outweigh the potential costs to majoritarian
policymaking.
B. Liability of Congress for Breach of Contract
Although Congress-has waived the executive branch's immunity for
most contract claims, it has never waived its own. The failure to waive
immunity is particularly understandable given that Congress's capacity
to contract is just one arrow in its quiver of regulatory strategies. The
government's power to contract, in other words, may resemble the
power to regulate more closely than the power to contract in the private
sector. Through contracting, the government can advance a wide pano-
ply of social goals. It can stimulate the economy, promote affirmative
action, or help small businesses. Thus, it is not surprising that Congress
has retained its flexibility to alter congressional contracts and agree-
ments when the dictates of public policy so warrant.
Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985) (discharging party's obligation under gas sales contract because
of its duty to comply with New Mexico's environmental regulations); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976) (excusing aircraft manufacturer because its
voluntary compliance with government requests to expedite production of military equipment
came within terms of excusable delay clause).
173. Contractors themselves might blunt the force of the sovereign act doctrine by insisting
upon an appropriate provision in the contract that guarantees the contractor a price adjustment if
sovereign acts should increase the cost of performance. There are apparently no reported cases in
which contractors successfully protected themselves from the consequences of a sovereign act.
Courts, however, have continued to advert to the possibility of contracting around the sovereign
act doctrine. See, for example, Amino Bros., 372 F.2d at 491; Gerhardt F. Meyne Co. v. United
States, 76 F. Supp. 811, 815 (Ct. Cl. 1948). Even if the government could pledge compensation for
breach due to a sovereign act, however, sovereign immunity still would preclude the government
from limiting its right to take such actions in the future. Amino Bros., 372 F.2d at 491.
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Concerns for majoritarian governance militate strongly in favor of
some form of continued immunity for congressional contracts. Imposing
damages for congressional breaches of contract could allow one Con-
gress to exert too much influence over the policy choices of future legis-
lators. 174 By implementing policy initiatives in the form of contracts,
Congress could make it prohibitive for subsequent generations to alter
those initiatives, whether in arms procurement, social security, or inter-
state highway construction. As our defense needs change, Congress
should remain free to strike new deals. Courts could impede Congress's
ability to fashion policy with an eye to current needs if they forced
Congress to satisfy all the obligations of its predecessors. 17 5 Immunity
thus enables each Congress to be more responsive to contemporary
priorities.
The Supreme Court has been sympathetic to that need for immu-
nity, consistently construing congressional enactments to preserve Con-
gress's exercise of sovereign power.17 Because sovereign power is an
"enduring presence" that controls all contracts, it "remain[s] intact un-
less surrendered in unmistakable terms,' 77 particularly when the con-
tract implements a comprehensive social program that would affect
millions of individuals.178 The Supreme Court has read into most legis-
lation the implied condition that Congress always can change policy if
new conditions make that course appropriate.
174. See United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977) (stating
that the Contract Clause "does not require a State to adhere to a contract that surrenders an
essential attribute of its sovereignty"). As Justice Brennan said in his dissent: "One of the funda-
mental premises of our popular democracy is that each generation of representatives can and will
remain responsive to the needs and desires of those whom they represent. Crucial to this end is the
assurance that new legislators will not automatically be bound by the policies and undertakings of
earlier days." Id. at 45 (Brennan dissenting).
175. Supreme Court analysis of the state impairment of contract doctrine presents an inter-
esting analogy. As with sovereign act cases, the Court has been much more likely to uphold "im-
pairments" when the contracts involve sovereign prerogatives, such as promotion of safety, that
should not be bargained away. See, for example, Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498
(1919)). See also Eule, 1987 Am. Bar. Found. Res. J. at 419-24 (cited in note 132); Sterk, 88 Colum.
L. Rev. at 668-88 (cited in note 132).
176. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 470 U.S. 451 (1985);
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). State courts initially took the lead in
developing doctrines to prevent state legislatures from binding the hands of their successors. See,
for example, Metropolitan Bd. of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657, 667 (1866) (upholding the revoca-
tion of a liquor license on the ground that no state legislature can bind future legislatures through
power to contract); Moore v. State, 48 Miss. 147 (1873) (upholding the revocation of lottery license
on similar grounds).
177. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52
(1986). The Court in Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pe-
ters) 420, 544 (1837), stated that "any ambiguity in the terms of the contract, must operate against
the adventurers and in favour of the public."
178. Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 53.
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In Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrap-
ment,"'9 California brought a Fifth Amendment challenge to Congress's
alleged breach of an agreement to allow any state to withdraw its em-
ployees from the social security system. Prior to 1983, states wishing to
enroll their employees in social security executed an agreement with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services that specified the type of em-
ployees who were covered. However, when the number of withdrawals
from the system threatened its financial integrity, Congress amended
the Social Security Act by repealing the termination provision to pre-
vent states from withdrawing employees even if a termination notice
had been filed prior to enactment of the amendment.180
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the legislation, concluding
that Congress had not breached any contractual right or understand-
ing."8' The Court commented that the contractual right at issue did not
constitute a property right under the Fifth Amendment. "Rather, the
provision simply was part of a regulatory program over which Congress
retained authority to amend in the exercise of its power to provide for
the general welfare."'' 82 Because Congress retained its right under the
initial enactment to "repeal, alter, or amend" any provision, 83 the 1983
legislation did not violate California's rights, but merely modified a gen-
eral regulatory program. California, like other affected states, can vindi-
cate its interests through logrolling in Congress.
On the other hand, continued immunity may undervalue the
majoritarian pedigree of the earlier congressional commitment. The
current majority may give short shrift to the obligations of its predeces-
sors. Political checks cannot safeguard the public interest fully when
the proposed congressional repudiation would harm only a relative few,
particularly if the coalitions favoring such contractual arrangements
have dissipated, and if the disadvantaged few have little current politi-
cal power.8 The danger that a current majority simply will repudiate
debts owed to a minority always exists, 85 such as if Congress termi-
nated social security payments for one hundred individuals selected by
lottery. Even though we may wish to encourage Congress to reexamine
policy set by past legislatures, contemporary political process checks
179. 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
180. Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 71-72, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 418(f) (1983).
181. 477 U.S. at 53-54.
182. Id. at 55.
183. Id. at 53.
184. See generally Levmore, 77 Va. L. Rev. at 1333 (cited in note 62).
185. Because of the efforts of states to repudiate Revolutionary War debts, the framers were
alert to protect against such possible conduct. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787 at 273-82 (Univ. of North Carolina, 1969). States as well as municipalities
since have attempted such repudiations. See Sterk, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 668-88 (cited in note 132).
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may not protect prior contracting parties adequately, and may not
value sufficiently the prior majoritarian commitment.
C. Fifth Amendment Constraints
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, is not absolute. Al-
though courts have not applied the Takings and Due Process Clauses as
substantive restrictions on the government's general immunity from
tort, they have invoked the Clauses to superintend uncompensated
breaches of contract. Congress's extensive waiver of its agents' contrac-
tual immunity largely obviates consideration of any constitutional con-
straints in that context. But Congress's continuing retention of
immunity for itself has forced consideration of the constitutional issues,
and courts consistently have asserted (and occasionally held) that at
some point congressional breaches violate the Takings Clause or related
due process principles. 186
Judicial review of congressional determinations to breach arguably
is consistent with the concerns for preserving majoritarian policy under-
lying the sovereign immunity doctrine. Although the determination to
breach may reflect majoritarian policy, so did the prior congressional
obligation. In light of the inability of the political process to protect
fully against congressional self-dealing, review under the Fifth Amend-
ment supplies an external check to minimize opportunistic behavior. 187
Courts in effect must evaluate the processes underlying the two govern-
mental determinations-agreement and breach-to determine whether
to allow the breach. Although there is a strong bias against permitting
186. Invalidating congressional action under the Due Process Clause may have different con-
sequences from finding that just compensation must be awarded. Compare Public Agencies, 477
U.S. at 55 (discussing the limits of the Takings Clause) with Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571,
579 (1934) (invalidating congressional breach under the Due Process Clause). See also Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (stating that the Supreme Court has long held that
the Due Process Clause limits Congress's ability to effect retroactive changes.)
This Article does rot address the significance of the remedial distinction, but focuses on the
contexts in which either clause may be invoked to invalidate a congressional enactment.
187. Alternatively, the entire problem of sovereign immunity could be viewed through the
lens of takings analysis. We could inquire why some government actions condemning property,
regulating property, and amending contracts require compensation, and others do not. The ab-
sence of any one explanatory theory has often been noted. See, for example, Jeremy Paul, The
Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1393 (1991).
At a minimum, many commentators have noted that takings law can be understood as a way
to prevent the government from singling out those who cannot wield effective power in the legisla-
ture. See, for example, Levmore, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1333, 1334-35 (cited in note 62); Frank Michelman,
Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1602-03 (1988); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law § 9-6 at 605 (Foundation, 2d ed. 1988). There are many ways to define the set of those
who merit special protection from government takings, and fortunately that task lies outside the
scope of this Article. Rather, I am suggesting only that the Court's takings analysis in the contracts
context reflects an effort to prevent such singling out.
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one Congress to bind future generations, if the legislative determination
to breach does not stem from legitimate policy considerations, then it
may be more consistent with democratic governance to invalidate the
breach in order to uphold the obligation of the prior Congress.
The Court's decision in Lynch v. United States"' provides a help-
ful example. There, the plaintiff sued to contest the federal govern-
ment's refusal to pay the proceeds of an insurance contract issued
under congressional auspices during World War I.189 The government
insurance plan was designed to facilitate the war effort by bolstering
domestic support. In 1933, however, Congress repudiated its obligations
under one aspect of the insurance plan, which affected only several
hundred policy holders.190 Although there may have been widespread
sympathy for survivors of World War I veterans, sympathizers could
not have been expected to lobby against the repeal during the Depres-
sion, particularly given that the overwhelming majority of insurance
policies were still honored. Though the potential difficulty of offering
similar insurance contracts in the future may have constrained Con-
gress to some extent, the pressing need to address the country's eco-
nomic ills presumably thrust aside concerns for the future efficacy of
insurance plans. The Court, not surprisingly, invalidated the repeal
under the Due Process Clause.1 9'
Through the Takings or Due Process Clause, therefore, courts can
police the current Congress's self-dealing, determining when to honor
the commitment of the prior Congress. In the regulatory context, how-
ever, the risk of opportunistic behavior is slight. Changes in regulatory
agreements generally are checked adequately by the political process.'92
To the extent that the government action arises from a program to pro-
mote the public good 9" and affects more individuals, there is less rea-
son to question whether the political process has been open. California,
188. 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
189. War Risk Insurance Act, 40 Stat. 398 (1917), codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1988 (1988).
190. Economy Act (Maintenance of Credit of United States) of March 20, 1933, 48 Stat. 8;
Veterans' Administration, Annual Report of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, H. Doc. No.
322, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1935).
191. The Court reasoned that the United States was without power to annul binding con-
tracts, at least in the absence of supervening conditions. Although the Court recognized that "there
was in March, 1933, great need of economy," it concluded that Congress could not simply repudi-
ate its obligations. 292 U.S. at 580. See also Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-54 (1935)
(limiting Congress's repudiation of obligation to redeem war bonds). The Court more recently sug-
gested that congressional breaches, as in Lynch and Perry, could constitute takings under the
Fifth Amendment. Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 55. See also Atlas Corp., 895 F.2d at 756-58. The
Court, however, is unlikely to require that any party injured by a congressional breach of contract
be compensated with its full expectancy interest.
192. See text accompanying notes 181-83 and note 192.
193. Id. at 226-27.
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for instance, can protect itself from change in social security policy
through lobbying in Congress. When Congress breaches a regulatory
agreement with California, it recognizes that procuring California's co-
operation in the future may be more difficult.194
In contrast, there is more reason to question the actions of the con-
temporary Congress when it legislates in a proprietary context. Individ-
uals and businesses contracting with the government generally have less
ability to shape congressional deliberations through coalition-building
or logrolling, and Congress has less reason to fear that isolated breaches
with individuals will deter others from contracting with Congress in the
future. Courts apparently inquire in such circumstances whether the
congressional repudiation is based on a change in general policy, which
is checked by the political process, or on mere financial self-interest. If,
for instance, Congress simply refuses to pay a contractor for building a
new addition to the Library of Congress, there is no compelling reason
to rely on the checks provided by the political process. On the other
hand, if Congress decides to suspend all building programs, despite a
prior pledge, that change should be immune from secondguessing even
though it disrupts the expectations of a contractor selected to build the
addition.
In essence, the reviewing courts withdraw their preference for the
contemporary political process when the legislative action resembles a
194. Similarly, in Ohio Student Loan Comm'n v. Cavazos, 900 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1990), the
state loan commission sued to block Congress's unilateral decision to change the terms of its rela-
tionship with state loan agencies implementing the student loan program. Under terms of the orig-
inal agreement, Higher Education Act of 1965 § 422, Pub. L. No. 89-320, 79 Stat. 1236, codified at
20 U.S.C. § 1072 (1988), the federal government reinsures the state agencies' guarantee of student
loans. The state agencies receive administrative cost allowances from the federal government, as
well as at least partial reimbursement for losses sustained due to defaults by student borrowers. In
1987, Congress mandated that any excess reserve funds in the state agencies would be transferred
to the federal government through several possible means, such as withholding governmental rein-
surance payments. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-36. In this regulatory context, the political
process checks likely are sufficient. Most states operate a guaranteed student loan program, and
the Secretary has contracted with state loan commissions in almost every state to administer the
program.
Although not every state loan commission administered the program as efficiently as Ohio,
those that did easily could have voiced their opposition to the new statute. Less efficient states
may have formed a coalition to urge Congress to pass the new legislation, yet Ohio and the more
efficient states may have extracted some concession on another piece of legislation in exchange.
Viewed another way, the state loan commissions fully participated in the decision forcing transfer
of the excess fund reserves, and we trust the political safeguards of federalism.
If Ohio alone were singled out by the new legislation, the takings question would be tougher,
although the court probably still would have ruled in favor of the federal government because of
the regulatory nature of the prior agreement. See also Peterson v. United States Dep't of Interior,
899 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a contract-based challenge by local water districts and land-
owners to unilateral federal action that raised the price certain landowners had to pay for water
from federal reclamation projects).
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repudiation of debt.19 5 As it stands, however, the inquiry into the na-
ture of the breached agreement is a rough proxy for the infinitely more
complex inquiry into the comparative trustworthiness of the legislative
process that led to enactment of the original agreement and the process
that resulted in breach.
In sum, immunity from contract suit may be vital to preserve the
discretion of the policymaking branches in formulating national policy,
and Congress has refused to tie its own hands by opening itself, and its
delegates, to market rules for breach of contract. 196 While Congress can
waive the government's immunity in the short run, it cannot precommit
succeeding Congresses to abide by its own waiver decisions. Courts gen-
erally have respected such rules of differential liability, protecting Con-
gress's ability to choose when the government needs flexibility to
change regulatory requirements, free from fear of incurring common-
law liability on the contract. By shielding government policy from dam-
age assessments, retained immunity prevents current governments from
tying the hands of governments to follow. When inadequate process
protects against government opportunism, however, courts have second-
guessed Congress's failure to waive immunity through takings or due
process jurisprudence.
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is perplexing in view of its ten-
uous grounding in history, the seemingly inequitable results it produces,
and the absence of any traditional rationale justifying such favored
treatment for the federal government. Yet the inequity and incoherence
of blanket immunity has led commentators and courts to overlook plau-
sible justifications for a more circumscribed doctrine.
Sovereign immunity can be seen as a fundamental attribute of our
scheme of separation of powers. Congress plausibly should be entrusted
to ascertain when imposing damages upon the policymaking branches
would interfere too substantially with democratic governance. Congress
may get it wrong, but sovereign immunity allows it to protect demo-
cratic rule, both from the horizontal grasp of judges and the temporal
reach of prior policymakers.
In the tort context, Congress plausibly has concluded that judicial
195. For instance, instead of a takings approach, some might prefer that courts enforce con-
gressional precommitments not to breach within the same generation as long as there have been no
unforeseen economic or political developments. That approach has problems as well. Determining
what constitutes a "generation" or what constitutes "unforeseen developments" may prove quite
daunting, and the costs of judicial sorting could prove too high. Moreover, repudiation of a long-
term contract for purely financial reasons may be problematic despite a change in generation.
196. See text accompanying notes 139-73.
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review of the substance of legislative and executive branch policy under
general reasonableness principles would arrogate too much authority to
courts. The prospect of damages might hinder or skew the policymaking
branches' efforts to fashion policy. Thus, Congress's protection of poli-
cymaking efforts through the FTCA's discretionary function exception
makes eminent sense, as does part of the protection afforded by the
misrepresentation exception and continued immunity from some Bivens
claims. Similarly, Congress's decision not to impose full contract dam-
ages for government breaches of contract encourages government efforts
to revise policy in light of pressing social needs. In addition, this deci-
sion prevents present Congresses and administrations from gaining too
much control over the public policies of those that are to follow. The
sovereign act doctrine and limitations in the relief available to govern-
ment contractors both reasonably safeguard government policymaking.
Continued immunity in even these limited contexts, however, im-
poses a substantial toll upon individuals injured by arbitrary govern-
ment action, whether in tort or contract. To some extent, the lack of
full damages relief is justified by the compensating advantages to gov-
ernment contractors in terms of higher price, the security of contracting
with a fiscally sound party, and the ability to lobby for relief from Con-
gress through private bills and public relief acts. Still, from the perspec-
tive of a corrective justice principle, immunity unquestionably works
some injustice. Moreover, the government's failure to pay full compen-
sation may lead to wasteful government conduct. .
Nonetheless, the need to protect the political process arguably war-
rants the costs of inadequate compensation and possibly insufficient de-
terrence of government waste. It is for Congress to determine when
evaluation of government policy should take place in the political
rather than in the judicial arena. And the line that congressional waiv-
ers generally follow is quite coherent. There is less reason to fear, and
correspondingly to review in court, purposeful government policy. Such
policy, whether formulated by Congress itself or by agencies, has been
subjected to significant political checks, which should minimize the po-
tential for abuse. Government wrongdoing doubtlessly will continue,
but redress should come from the political rather than judicial process.
Retained immunity thus makes sense when the potential harm
from judicial review-interference with government policymak-
ing-outweighs any incremental gains from added deterrence of govern-
ment tortious behavior and added efficiency in government contracting.
The case against waiver is most compelling in protecting purposeful
governmental action that is subject to the checks and balances inherent
in our political system. Such checks minimize the need for common-law
monitoring, and instead suggest the propriety of political resolution of
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the dispute. Thus, although the case for blanket immunity is tenuous,
our system of separated powers assigns Congress the power to deter-
mine when continued immunity is appropriate to protect the political
process.
